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THE PATIENT LIFE: 
CAN CONSUMERS 
DIRECT HEALTH CARE? 
CARLE. SCHNEIDERt &MARKA. HALLtt 
Then said Evangelist, ''If this be thy condition, why standest thou still?" 
He answered, "Because I know not whither to go." 
John Bunyan 
The Pilgrim's Progress 
ABSTRACT 
The ultimate aim of health care policy is good care at good prices. 
Managed care failed to achieve this goal through influencing providers, so 
health policy has turned to the only market-based option left: treating patients 
like consumers. Health insurance and tax policy now pressure patients to 
spend their own money when they select health plans, providers, and 
treatments. Expecting patients to choose what they need at the price they 
want, consumerists believe that market competition will constrain costs while 
optimizing quality. This classic form of consumerism is today's health policy 
watchword. 
This article evaluates consumerism and the regulatory mechanism of 
which it is essentially an example - legally mandated disclosure of 
information. We do so by assessing the crucial assumptions about human 
nature on which consumerism and mandated disclosure depend. 
Consumerism operates in a variety of contexts in a variety of ways with a 
variety of aims. To assess so protean a thing, we ask what a patient's life 
would really be like in a consumerist world. The literature abounds in 
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For the reasons given in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U Chicago L 
Rev 1343 (1986), we renounce the iniquitous Bluebook and all its works. Instead we follow the 
University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation. 
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theories about how medical consumers should behave. We look for empirical 
evidence about how real people actually buy health plans, choose providers, 
and select treatments. 
We conclude that consumerism, and thus mandated disclosure generally, 
are unlikely to accomplish the goals imagined for them. Consumerism's 
prerequisites are too many and too demanding. First, consumers must have 
choices that include the coverage, care-takers, and care they want. Second, 
reliable information about those choices must be available. Third, 
information must be put bifore consumers, especially by doctors. Fourth, 
consumers must receive the information. Fifth, the information must be 
. complete and comprehensible enough for consumers to use it. Sixth, consumers 
must understand what they are told. Seventh, consumers must be willing to 
analyze the information. Eighth, consumers must actually analyze the 
information and do so well enough to make good choices. 
Our review of the empirical evidence concludes that these prerequisites 
cannot be met reliably most of the time. At every stage people encounter 
daunting hurdles. Like so many other dreams of controlling costs and giving 
patients control, consumerism is doomed to disappoint. This does not mean 
that consumerist tools should never be used. It means they should not be used 
unadvisedly or lightly, but discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in the fear of 
error. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CLATIERING TRAIN 
Who is in charge of the clattering train? 
The axles creak and the couplings strain, 
And the pace is hot and the points are near, 
And sleep hath deadened the driver's ear, 
And the signals flash through the night in vain, 
For Death is in charge of the clattering train. 
Anonymous 
The United States spends too much for the health care it receives. Yearly, 
the problem worsens.1 More of the GDP (16%) goes to health care than in any 
comparable country without buying appreciably superior health. Medical 
goods and services cost more than in similar countries. 2 Their prices rise 
faster than inflation. And perhaps "more than 25 percent of all health care 
spending is either entirely unnecessary or is of only questionable or marginal 
benefit. "3 Who is in charge of this clattering train? 
Everyone wants the train subdued. Governments worry because they pay 
for so many people's care. Employers worry because the more they pay for 
insurance the less they can pay in wages. Employees worry because they 
defray ever larger shares of medical costs. We all should worry because while 
Clark C. Havighurst and Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American 
Health Care, 69 L & Contemp Prob 7, 11 (2006). 
2 Id at 13. 
Mark A. Hall, Making Medical Spending Decisions: The Law, Ethics €5 Economics of 
Rationing Mechanisms 21 (Oxford, 1997). 
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insurance appears to insulate us, ultimately we pay - as taxpayers, as 
employees, as consumers - for what we receive. And even while we worry 
about costs, we worry also about quality. Controlling the train means 
reducing costs while improving quality. 
A. CONTROLLING COSTS AND QUALITY 
Lawmakers, employers, health plans, and hospitals have long tried to stop 
the clattering train. But costs rise irrepressibly because irrepressible forces 
push them. Technology, for example, can be marvelous, but it can also be 
costly.4 And specialization combines with technology to require expensively 
bureaucratized medicine. 
The financial structure of medical care also accelerates costs. Doctors and 
hospitals commonly charge fees for services. The more services, the more 
fees; the higher the fees, the higher the income. Doctors decide what patients 
need. Doctors are professionals, and "commercial" practices are undignified 
and displease professional associations, so historically, "[p]rice competition 
was disavowed as unbefitting a learned profession and as inappropriate for a 
vital service."5 Thus "medical professionalism created a spiral of expanding 
capacity, technology, utilization, and cost. Fee-for-service payment to 
physicians and cost-based reimbursement to hospitals rewarded extensive and 
complex care. Physicians recommended more visits, more tests, and more 
procedures."6 So even early in the twentieth century, costs climbed.7 
The clattering train was once slowed by want of fuel. When shallow-
pocketed individuals paid, costs could only go so high. Then came the deep 
pockets. Employers (stimulated by tax incentives) insured employees. 
Government (stimulated by social duty) insured the old and the poor. 
Insurers paid "usual and customary" rates - essentially, what doctors and 
hospitals charged. Thus fueled, the train sped up. Robinson puts it neatly: 
4 Economists generally agree that the "principal factor by far [in rising costs] is 
medical innovations like new drugs, new surgical procedures and new diagnostic techniques." 
Gina Kolata, A Conversation with Victor Fuchs: An Economist's View of Health Care Reform, 
New York Times F6 (May 2, 2000). 
5 James C. Robinson, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: Competition and 
Innovation in Health Care 21 (Berkeley, 1999). 
6 Id at 23. 
Committee on Costs of Medicare, Medical Care for the American People (Chicago, 
1932). 
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Physicians and hospitals were motivated to provide ever more 
and better services, since higher costs generated higher revenues. 
Patients were motivated to demand more and better services 
since the costs were shifted onto insurers and thence to 
employers and taxpayers. Employers were motivated to expand 
the breadth and generosity of insured benefits to capture the tax 
subsidy. Medicare and Medicaid viewed their covered services as 
a statutory entitlement for beneficiaries . . . and were eager to 
accommodate physician interests so as to mitigate the traditional 
hostility of organized medicine. Everyone was saying yes and no 
one was saying no to the expansion of utilization, specialization, 
and expenditure. 8 
So the train rattled along briskly. But perhaps costs were justified by the 
quality of care? Alas, doctors were presumptively the only qualified judges, 
and the "profession systematically refused to discuss or divulge quality 
concerns to nonphysicians."9 However, unsettling hints abound. For 
example, hospitalization and surgery rates have "varied widely across 
geographic regions, with the best predictor being the number of hospital beds 
and practicing physicians; the prevalence of disease was not consistently 
associated with the frequency and intensity of care."10 And "[r]esearch 
studies, authoritative entities such as the Institute of Medicine (IOM), and the 
insurers' own claims data reveal widespread overuse, underuse, and misuse of 
services, compared with evidence-based norms and clinical guidelines. "11 
Employers and governments particularly have labored to slow the train. 
Their best success has been managed care. It wants for patients what 
consumers shop for- low prices and high quality. It assumes that providers 
drive the clattering train and that they can be persuaded to slow, steer, and 
stop it. Managed care stems costs by limiting patients' choice of providers and 
treatments and by inducing providers to economize. Inducements have 
included "oversight and report-card keeping on physicians' prescribing 
practices, rules about the use of primary care physicians as gatekeepers or 
their elimination altogether . . . evidence-based medicine . . . and 
requirements that doctors gain permission for expensive procedures. "12 
Managed care has had successes in controlling costs, but it has been 
savaged by patients who felt they were losing control of their medical care and 
by doctors who felt they were losing control of their work.13 So while managed 
care's success has been limited, managed care may not have failed; it was from 
its mother's womb untimely ripped. 
Robinson, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: Competition and Innovation in 
Health Care at 23 (cited in note 5). 
9 Id at 28. 
10 Id at 24. 
11 James C. Robinson and Jill M. Yegian, Medical Management After Managed Care, 
Health Affairs W4-269, W4-269-W4-270 (2004 - Web Exclusive), online at 
http:/ fcontent.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.269vl.pdf (visited Feb 9, 2009). 
12 Daniel Callahan and Angela A. Wasunna, Medicine and the Market: Equity v. Choice 
49 - 50 (Johns Hopkins, 2006). 
13 Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J Health 
Politics, Policy & L 427 (2005). 
,, 
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Managed care seeks good care at good prices by influencing providers. 
Many of its practices survive in some form, but the top-down, supply-side 
principle has been pummeled. That left a bottom-up, demand-side principle: 
Why not treat patients like consumers? Won't they select the care they need 
at the price they want? Won't the market spur competition that expands 
consumers' choices while constraining costs? This "consumerism" is today's 
watchword.14 As two writers said fifteen years ago, "[I]fwe want to solve the 
nation's health care crisis, we must apply the same commonsense principles to 
medical care that we apply to other goods and services. "15 As the former HHS 
Secretary said last year, "We have a better option, to provide beneficiaries with 
reliable information about the cost and quality of their care. When given that 
kind of information, we know that consumers will make decisions that drive 
costs down and the quality up. "16 
B. CRESCENDOING CONSUMERISM 
Consumers search for goods and services of high quality at low prices. 
Crucial among services is medical care, but few people shop for it like 
consumers, if only because of insurance.17 This is pleasant, but the dismal 
science warns us that when consumers want the best and ignore price, costs 
soar like the lark ascending. And when providers bill for each service, prices 
soar, well, like the hawk ascending. 
Of course, patients have been buying medical services for years. Managed 
care actually accelerated the movement toward consumerism and 
competition, if only by hastening the organization of doctors and hospitals 
into groups that competed for patients. Thus Professor Sage could write years 
ago, "The last two decades have witnessed an extraordinary shift toward 
reliance on competitive forces to reshape the American health care system, 
which previously had been characterized by professional decisionmaking, 
consumer deference, and price-insensitive insurance payment.ms 
14 
"It is clear that a consumer-driven revolution has begun, and there is reason to 
believe that it will shape the future direction of the health care system." Jill Quadagno, Who 
Wins? Who Loses? Who Pays?, 27 Health Affairs 294, 295 (2008). For especially intelligent 
treatments of consumerism, see Clark Havighurst's oeuvre. For his witty introduction to his 
own work, see Clark C. Havighurst, I've Seen Enough! My Life and Times in Health Care Law 
and Policy, 14 Health Matrix 107 (2004). An excellent and recent survey is Timothy Stoltzfus 
Jost, Health Care at Risk: A Critique of the Consumer-Driven Movement (Duke, 2007). 
Several book reviews provide an efficient (and sufficient?) introduction to consumerist 
writing. See Clark C. Havighurst, Healthy Competition: What's Holding Back Health Care and 
How To Free It, 25 Health Affairs 1740 (2006); Alan Maynard, Who Killed Health Care? 
America's $2 Trillion Medical Problem - and the Consumer-Driven Cure, 26 Health Affairs 
1783 (2007); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Care Reform Now!: A Prescription for Change, 27 
Health Affairs 291 (2008). 
15 John C. Goodman and Gerald L. Musgrave, Patient Power: The Free-Enterprise 
Alternative to Clinton's Health Plan vii (Cato Institute, 1994). 
16 Robert Pear, Bush Proposes Linking the Medicare Drug Premium to Benificiaries' 
Income, NY Times (Feb 16, 2008) (quoting Michael Levitt), online at 
http:/ fwww.nytimes.com/2008/02/16/washington/16health.html. 
17 Mark A. Hall, The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients as Medical 
Consumers, 96 Geo L J 583 (2008). 
18 William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American 
Health Care, 99 Colum L Rev 1701 (1999). "The fundamental idea underlying the theory of 
managed care was to achieve social equity through the distribution of vouchers ... that could 
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In any case, patients now make more purchasing decisions, and more 
consumerist proposals are aborning. These proposals vary, 19 but they use 
similar methods, make similar assumptions, and raise similar questions. We 
therefore evaluate consumerism through an ideal type. In this ideal type, 
consumers make three principal purchases. First, they choose their health 
care plan. Like good consumers, they decide which plan best suits their wants 
and purses. As consumers buy plans, competition for their custom generates 
splendid plans at sensible prices. 
Second, consumerism expects patients to choose doctors, hospitals, and 
other providers considering both quality and cost. Consumerist patients ask: 
Which providers offer inexpensive services? Which providers work with 
patients to control expenditures? Which providers treat patients decently? 
Which providers are competent - or truly excellent? Here, again, consumers 
already make some such choices - they may choose doctors, for instance. 20 
Third, consumerist patients buy tests and treatments. 21 In its strong form, 
consumerism has people spend their "own" money, not "insurance" money, to 
buy treatments, and hence patients choose thriftily. Few people can afford all 
the treatment they might need, so consumerism assumes insurance would pay 
"catastrophic" costs (that is, consumers get insurance with high deductibles). 
Most people can't afford high deductibles either; they teeter too close to 
the economic brink to find thousands of dollars in their pockets.22 So the tax 
code now lets employers create tax-sheltered "health-savings accounts" in 
which unspent funds accumulate from year to year. To qualify for the tax 
shelter, deductibles must range (currently) from $1,150 for individuals to 
$11,600 for families.23 Typically, employers put much of the deductible into 
the employees' account. Nevertheless, consumers spend their own money in 
several senses. First, they contribute to the account. Second, the employer's 
contribution is effectively part of the employee's salary. Third, consumers can 
use unspent money that accumulates (tax-free) for most health care expenses 
and can distribute it in their estates. 
be used only for the purchase of health insurance offered by a variety of private, competing 
health insurance plans." Uwe E. Reinhardt, Can Efficiency in Health Care Be Left to the 
Market?, 26 J Health Politics, Policy & L 967, 985 (2001). 
19 Perhaps the most popular of the labels, "consumer-directed health care," is "so 
widely used that many different concepts masquerade under its banner .... " Len M. Nichols, 
et al, Are Market Forces Strong Enough to Deliver Efficient Health Care Systems? Confidence Is 
Waning, 23 Health Affairs 8, 16 (2004). 
2° For evidence that people shop for doctors more than one might suppose, see Carl E. 
Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical Decisions (Oxford, 1998). 
21 To avoid grating repetition of "test or treatment," we normally use "treatment" to 
include "test." 
22 See Mark A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, 
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 Mich L Rev 643 (2008). 
23 US Dept Treasury, Treasury, IRS Issue 2009 Indexed Amounts for Health Savings 
Accounts, online at http:/ fwww.treas.gov/pressfreleases/hp975.htm (visited Mar 21, 2009). 
Seventy percent of the people with family coverage in a consumerist plan had "a family 
deductible of $2,000 to $4,999; 29 percent reported a deductible of at least $5,000." Paul 
Fronstin and Sara R. Collins, Findings from the 2007 EBRI/Commonwealth Fund 
Consumerism in Health Survey, 315 EBRI Issue Brief 1, 9 (2008), online at 
http:/ fwww.commonwealthfund.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=673661 
(visited Feb 9, 2009). 
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Parts of the consumerist agenda are already operating. Many insurers 
have adopted consumerist devices. "Deductibles are increasing, copayments 
for physician office visits and prescription drugs are increasing, and health 
plans are increasingly more likely to provide incentives for beneficiaries to use 
generic drugs and/ or mail order pharmacy services, and other forms of tiered 
benefits .... "24 Already, "40% of primary care physicians are providing care 
to CDHP enrollees," and this "may be an underestimate because it does not 
account for those physicians who are unaware of their patients' CDHP 
coverage."25 In addition, "[t]his policy approach has been strongly adopted in 
the Medicare program, where older adults typically face choices among 50 or 
more prescription drug plans as well managed care options. "26 
So surely consumerism's time is come. Not only are its three parts old 
hat; both sides of the ideological spectrum can like it. The right can like using 
markets to tame prices and ensure quality. Consumerism simultaneously fits 
neatly with the standard principle of the leftish ''bioethics" side of health law: 
Offering patients control over their medical care is thefons et origo, the alpha 
and omega of bioethical law.27 That law works mainly through mandated 
disclosure - by requiring patients be given good enough information to make 
their own decisions.28 The paramount example is informed consent, but it is 
only one of many programs that - like consumerism - aspire to "empower" 
patients by giving them information and thus the power to choose what they 
want.29 
C. CONSIDERING CONSUMERISM 
This article undertakes three enterprises. First, consumerism is the latest 
of many battered attempts to control costs while optimizing care. Will it 
work? Will it quiet the clattering train? Our second enterprise is evaluating 
the regulatory mechanism of which consumerism is an example - legally 
mandated disclosure of information so that one party to a transaction can 
make good decisions. Our third enterprise is assessing the crucial 
assumptions about human nature on which consumerism and mandated 
disclosure depend. 
The consumerist agenda provokes deja vu all over again. Many plans 
have been laid to tame costs, improve quality, and expand control. Taming 
costs fails with doleful regularity. Improving quality is horribly hard. And the 
24 Id at 4. 
25 Giridhar Mallya, et al, Are Primary Care Physician Ready to Practice in a Consumer-
Driven Environment?, 14 Am J Managed Care 661, 665 (2008). 
26 Jessica Greene, et al, Comprehension and Choice of a Consumer-Directed Health 
Plan: An Experimental Study, 14 Am J Managed Care 369, 374 (2008). 
27 Marsha Garrison and Carl E. Schneider, The Law of Bioethics: Individual Autonomy 
and Social Regulation 27-467 (West, 2003). 
28 William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American 
Health Care, 99 Columbia L Rev 1701 (1999). 
29 For example, the Patient Self-Determination Act seeks to encourage patients to use 
advance directives to make "pre-need" decisions lest incompetence should prevent them from 
exercising their authority. 42 USC § 1395cc(a) (2008). The PSDA requires that patients be 
given information about advance directives. HIP AA regulations seek to permit patients to 
protect the confidentiality of medical information about them. 45 CFR Parts 160, 162, 164 
(2009). The regulations require doctors and hospitals to give patients the information they 
need to manage the handling of confidential information. 
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principal legal attempts to give patients more control routinely disappoint.30 
When plausible policies repeatedly fail to achieve excellent goals despite 
exceptional efforts, there are usually high, and sometimes insuperable, 
barriers to reaching the goals. Is it thus with consumerism? 
Consumerism operates in a variety of contexts in a variety of ways with a 
variety of aims; its success thus depends on a variety of things and must be 
variously measured. All this variety is inevitable, if only because consumerism 
cannot simply be ordained. Rather, the federal government has used tax 
policy, its influence as an insurer, and its power as an employer to promote 
consumerism and all that may still be too little. Nor have commentators 
agreed on what consumerism is and how it should work. So "consumerism" in 
health care is various both in action and in books, and it has been defended 
and attacked in various ways. 
To assess this Proteus,31 we scrutinize consumerism's distinctive and 
crucial feature: purchasers choosing well. We use a fresh technique - we 
systematically ask what prerequisites must be met for consumerism to succeed 
and whether they will be met. Our answers rest on empirical evidence about 
how people buy health plans, choose providers, and select treatments. When 
there is no such evidence, we consult empirical research on comparable 
decisions. 
More specifically, we ask what a consumer's life would really be like in a 
consumerist world. What would the human experience of consumerism 
actually be? Would people behave as required? The literature abounds in 
theories about how these medical consumers should behave. We look for 
evidence. 
This brings us to our article's second enterprise. One ofthe law's favorite 
devices is to require a more knowledgeable (and thus presumptively stronger) 
party to provide information to a less knowledgeable (and thus weaker) 
party.32 Securities laws are an ambitious example. Courts and commentators 
debate what disclosures should be required in boilerplate contracts. Product 
liability law invites manufacturers to disclose dangers their goods pose. 
Credit card companies must reveal their terms to card users. Truth-in-
lending acts are supposed to make borrowers good judges of lending terms. 
Miranda warnings give suspects information to use in dealing with police. 
And there are hundreds of other examples. 
Mandated disclosure and consumerism operate similarly. Their success 
depends on how well information can be assembled, disclosed, received, 
understood, analyzed, and used. This is why research on mandated disclosure 
30 For examples, see Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 Wake Forest L Rev 411 
(2006). 
31 A complete evaluation would be broad. At the least, it would ask economic questions 
like: Isn't much of our health care dollar spent on a small group of people whose care is so 
expensive that deductibles are irrelevant? Are health care costs driven by forces - like 
technology and the institutions of health care - that consumers can little affect? For an 
excellent survey of the issues, see Jost, Health Care at Risk (cited in note 14). 
32 As we write, CNN tells us to "take heart, there may be more legislation ... on the 
way. Last month New Jersey became the first state to enact a law that requires [match-
making websites] to disclose whether they do background checks on members." Jen Haley, Be 
a Savvy Consumer When Looking for Love Online, CNN.com, online at 
http:/ fwww.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/personal/02/14/roym.online.dating/index.html (visited 
Feb 10, 2009). 
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helps us understand consumerism, and why our technique for studying 
consumerism helps us evaluate mandated disclosure as a regulatory method. 
So to our third enterprise. We conclude that consumerism, and thus 
mandated disclosure generally, are unlikely to accomplish the goals imagined 
for them. Consumerism's prerequisites are too many and too exigent. 
Consumers make many purchases with aplomb. Most things consumers 
acquire they buy regularly and judge easily. Those products are sold in 
national markets in which competition works its Smithian magic. But health 
plans, providers, and treatments are chosen sporadically, are hard to assess 
even after the purchase, and are often sold in small and stodgy markets. So 
health care choices are harshly more demanding than most other purchases, 
as Kenneth Arrow famously said long ago. 33 
Consumerism and mandated disclosure, then, rest on suppositions about 
how people respond to incentives to buy unfamiliar products wisely. They 
rest, that is, on assumptions about human nature. Those assumptions are 
generally unexamined and generally misleading. They fundamentally 
misunderstand human nature. First, they misunderstand how people make 
decisions and over-estimate their willingness and ability to do so. Second, 
they misunderstand how people want to lead their lives; they forget that 
people have better things to do than becoming model consumers. 
Our review of how people in a consumerist world would choose health 
plans, providers, and treatments, then, concludes that at every stage people 
would encounter daunting hurdles. Like so many dreams of controlling costs 
and giving patients control, consumerism is doomed to disappoint. This does 
not mean that consumerist tools should never be used. It means they should 
not be used unadvisedly or lightly, but discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in the 
fear of error. 
II. THE AV AILABILIIT OF GOOD CHOICES 
Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the Shadow 
T. S. Eliot 
The Hollow Men 
We now begin our project of evaluating consumerism by systematically 
reviewing its prerequisites. The first prerequisite is that consumers need 
alternatives adequate to the variety of purchasers and circumstances for each 
purchase: plans, providers, and treatments. Will this happen? Sometimes 
somewhat, but often little. 
33 Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am 
Economic Rev 941 (1963). 
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A. THRIFIY HEALTH PLANS 
Some prominent consumerists - Havighurst is a distinguished example -
propose that costs may be moderated and patients may better match their 
expenditures to their preferences if they can purchase health insurance the 
way they purchase other services. The consumerist agenda will thus wither if 
consumers lack adequate choices. Yet many consumers have no such options 
and faint prospect of getting them. 
Many people "have no real or perceived choice in their employment, 
health insurance, or health plan."34 Even larger employers in larger cities may 
offer employees only a few choices, and few employers offer many. For 
example, "in 1999 approximately half of individuals covered by employer-
sponsored plans had no choice or limited choice of health plans."35 And 
"Robert Berenson . . . contends that 'only a few large and prominent 
employers are redesigning employer contribution formulas to encourage value 
purchasing, contracting directly with provider-based delivery systems, or 
using quality data ... in any meaningful way to select plans.'" Medium-sized 
employers '"do not even seem to understand the difference between the price 
of particular provider services and their aggregate cost ... , much less to be 
able to separate fact from fiction on quality measures.'"36 
Even consumers offered several plans may have scanty choices. This 
insurance comes in prix fixe packages; you can't choose a la carte. But you 
will rarely be offered the meal you want. Buying insurance is not (to change 
the metaphor) like buying a car, where you can take a showroom model or 
design your own farrago of options. Insurers cannot afford to let people buy 
only coverage they know they will need. Nor must competition inspire 
variety; on the contrary, competitors may converge around packages likeliest 
to attract buyers. 
Employers might even dislike long a la carte menus. Employers don't 
want under-insured and hence under-treated, bankrupt, and bitter employees. 
The more options consumers have, the likelier they are to choose 
improvidently, and pressure to economize drives employees toward under-
insurance. Under-insurance matters, especially since the distance between 
lavish and stingy is wide. Under-insurance can wreck financial and physical 
health. Costs of illness (particularly medical bills and loss of income) 
contribute to more than half of personal bankruptcies.37 And even shaving 
back coverage can hurt. One longitudinal study, for example, 
"demonstrate[d] significantly worse health outcomes among individuals who 
reported restricting their use of prescription medications because of cost .... 
[C]ost-related medication restriction was associated with almost twice the 
34 Amy B. Bernstein and Anne K. Gauthier, Choices in Health Care: What Are They and 
What Are They Worth?, 56 Med Care Res & Rev 5, 11 (1999). 
35 Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit, 47 SLU L Rev 
365, 375 (2003). 
36 Lawrence D. Brown, Management by Objection?: Public Policies to Protect Choice in 
Health Plans, 56 Med Care Res & Rev 145, 157 (1999). 
37 See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 SLU L Rev 307 
(2007); Melissa B. Jacoby and Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An 
Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 Nw U L Rev 535, 538-539 
(2006); R.W. Seifert and M. Rukavina, Bankruptcy Is the Tip of a Medical-Debt Iceberg, 25 
Health Affairs w89 (2006- Web Exclusive). 
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odds of experiencing a significant decline in overall health over 2 years of 
follow up."38 
In short, health plans do not now meet consumerism's first prerequisite -
adequate choice. Nor can they without restructuring health care financing in 
large, unlikely, and possibly unwise ways. 
B. THRIF'IY TREATMENT CHOICES 
Consumerism promises to fix the clattering train by pressuring patients to 
"take a more active interest than they hitherto have had in the cost-
effectiveness of their care. "39 Patients spending their own money should buy 
treatments cheaply and eschew wasteful care. But will patients have scope to 
economize on treatments? Not if no savings are practically possible or if 
reforms have already eliminated excess expenditures. Nor need patients 
economize if they will exceed the year's deductible. So, how much 
opportunity and incentive to save will patients have? 
This question has two parts. First, are there substantial unexploited 
opportunities for economies? After all, "health care plans today already 
contain both substantial cost sharing and managed care measures that are 
likely to reduce spending."40 Second, will consumerism induce patients to 
exploit any such opportunities? 
Consumerism's easiest case is where equally effective treatments differ in 
cost. The classic example is generic drugs. Since by hypothesis the drugs are 
identical, the cheap treatment is so plainly preferable that doctors hardly need 
offer patients a choice. In these areas it's not clear how much room for 
improvement is left and whether referring decisions to patients helps. After 
all, managed care has campaigned for years to get doctors to substitute 
generics for brand-name drugs, and health plans increasingly use formularies 
to get doctors to prefer cheap to expensive drugs.41 These efforts and a 
changing medical culture have helped. For example, as early as ten years ago 
"[o]nly So/o of physicians preferred brand-name medications over generic 
drugs regardless of cost. "42 Similarly, patients who use emergency rooms or 
specialists for routine problems notoriously waste resources, but health plans 
have already attacked this problem by increasing copayments for ERs and by 
requiring referrals to specialists. 
Another easy case for consumerism is where patients decide whether a 
genuinely elective treatment is worth paying for. This category's borders are 
hazy, but some decisions, like cosmetic surgery, fit it neatly enough. But how 
38 Michele Heisler, et a!, The Health Effects of Restricting Prescription Medication Use 
Because of Cost, 42 Med Care 626, 630 (2004). 
39 Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of 
Secrecy, 25 Health Affairs 57, 65 (2006). 
40 Dahlia K. Remler and Sherry A. Glied, How Much More Cost Sharing Will Health 
Savings Accounts Bring?, 25 Health Affairs 1070, 1073 (2006). 
41 On formularies, their promise and problems, see Peter J. Neumann, et al, Do Drug 
Formulary Policies Rriflect Evidence of Value?, 12 Am J Managed Care 30 (2006). 
42 Steven Reichert, et a!, Physicians' Attitudes About Prescribing and Knowledge of the 
Costs of Common Medications, 160 Arch Intern Med 2799, 2800 (2000). For the contrasting 
view three decades ago, see Peter Temin, Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the 
United States 103, 105 (Harvard, 1980). 
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much can consumerism save here, since patients already pay for most such 
treatments? 
Consumerists' remaining core case is an optimal treatment and a cheaper 
sub-optimal treatment. At one extreme, the efficacy gap is so small and the 
cost gap so great that consumer choice is hardly needed to reach the 
economical result. At the other extreme, the efficacy gap is so great and the 
ailment so severe that the cheaper treatment seems hardly better than no 
treatment. Are there enough cases between these extremes to permit 
substantial savings? 
Two cases may exemplify this category. The patient has an upper 
respiratory tract infection and acute sinusitis. A cheaper antibiotic works 
70% of the time, a costlier one 80% and about a day faster. The consumerist 
patient weighs "the increased cost and potential side effects against the 
possibly quicker return to health." A "day of lost work may be more costly to 
her, in money or in other ways, than the additional cost of the more expensive 
antibiotic."43 Another example: In Pegram,44 the plan delayed a test that 
could have revealed the patient's appendicitis. Delay was probably cost-
effective for the patient population, but an individual patient might want to 
pay extra for peace of mind or to avoid coping with a burst appendix. 45 
Tests are a common example in this category. They can be expensive (e.g., 
MRis), and any test might be unnecessary (if the diagnosis is clear, tests are 
pointless). Furthermore, while tests are expensive, their costs usually fall 
within a high deductible, so that the patient might bear the cost. For example, 
some causes of back pain can be detected through an MRI, but those are 
unusual and not urgent problems. So it makes economic sense to treat the 
likelier causes and use an MRI only if that fails. But an anxious patient might 
think the test worth the cost. 
In yet another consumerist category, patients need a treatment but can't 
afford it. This is a category many doctors know well and the category likeliest 
to expand with thorough-going consumerism. Preventing needed care is 
presumably not consumerism's goal. Who wants more arbitrary, inequitable, 
and inefficient rationing? Faced with such cases, doctors often become social 
workers, scrambling to help patients jury-rig treatments. This helps patients, 
but it misuses doctors' skills. 
In sum, for consumerism to subdue costs, patients will need chances to 
economize. We have now asked how much choice will be available and how 
much scope for savings patients will have. The short answer is some of each, 
but not a lot of either. 
43 Paul Clay Sorum, Ethical Decision Making in Managed Care, 156 Arch Intern Med 
2041 (1996). 
++ Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 US 211 (2000). 
45 A plan without burst appendices is performing unnecessary appendectomies, which 
have their own risks. 
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III. THE AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION 
As to Holmes, I observed that he satfrequentlyfor half an hour on end, 
with knitted brows and an abstracted air, but he swept the matter 
away with a wave of his hand when I mentioned it. ''Data! data! 
data!" he cried impatiently. "I can't make bricks without clay." 
Arthur Conan Doyle 
TheAdventure of the Copper Beeches 
Now suppose away the problems we've discussed. Consumers have 
enough choices of plans, providers, and treatments to suit their wants and 
their wallets. They next need information. They need to know what's on offer, 
its quality, and its cost. Does this information exist? Will it be forthcoming? 
From reliable sources? In brief: sometimes possibly, but not easily often. 
A. DOES THE INFORMATION EXIST? 
Nobody can be told what nobody knows. Much information consumers 
need for choosing plans or providers cannot practically be compiled, would 
not willingly be compiled, or has not been worth compiling. Consumers get 
much less information than they need. Reinhardt is blunt: "Only rarely, in a 
few locations, do American patients have access to even a rudimentary version 
of the information infrastructure on which the theory of competitive market 
and the theory of managed care rest."46 Nor is managed care's experience 
inspiring. Organizations had every incentive to explain themselves. Yet they 
offered "patients a bewildering array of acronyms and concepts that even 
specialists sometimes have trouble characterizing" while doing "little to 
explain the concept" of managed care.47 
Might patients' demands induce providers to assemble information? 
Some, surely. But much information is hard to compile in a practical form. 
Take one indispensable datum - what doctors and hospitals charge. Prices 
are often unavailable in any form consumers could use to compare plans, 
providers, and treatments. They are often unavailable in any form anyone can 
readily use.48 
Hospitals' fees, for instance, are listed in a "charge master" - "a 
confidential list of charges made by the hospital for all its goods and services." 
It "is compiled and maintained by the hospital's chief financial officer on the 
hospital's computer system." Fifteen years ago, one hospital's charge master 
"contained approximately 295 pages and listed prices for approximately 7,650 
items." It was "confidential proprietary information" and "not shown to 
anyone other than the officers and employees of the hospital and authorized 
consultants." It was adjusted weekly "to reflect current cost data; the 
hospital's costs are marked up by a mathematical formula designed to produce 
46 Reinhardt, 26 J Health Politics, Policy & L at 967 (cited in note 18). 
47 Jacobson, 47 SLU L Rev at 374 (cited in note 35). 
48 For a failure described at length, see Hall and Schneider, 106 Mich L Rev at 643 
(cited in note 22). 
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a targeted amount of profit for the hospital. "49 And today, charge masters may 
contain as many as 45,000 items. 5° 
If you could get a charge master and if you could understand it, you would 
still have to decide which charges to use comparing plans or providers 
(recalling that prices change frequently). Even if you knew what illnesses you 
would have, you would have to predict the treatments (something even 
doctors might not know) as the charge master coded their components. Then 
you wouid need similar success with other plans and providers. 51 Even if you 
could do all this, would you? 
Consumers run a pilot test of consumerism when they buy in vitro 
fertilization, cosmetic surgery, and dental crowns. These "[c]onsumers 
engage in little price shopping." Most consumers accept other patients' 
recommendations or physician referrals in choosing providers of IVF and 
rhinoplasty. "For dental crowns, virtually all patients choose to stay with their 
regular dentist rather than shop around." Significantly, an "important reason 
why shopping takes place so infrequently for these procedures is that accurate 
price quotes can only be obtained after undergoing in-person screening 
exams, since costs vary according to patient characteristics and medical needs 
as assessed by each provider."52 
Consumers usually learn best through experience, but experience is a 
sorry guide to hospital costs, since even long stays unloose only a drop in the 
Niagara of possible charges. Nor can you know how typical your experience is 
or what another hospital would charge. Nor will your bill teach you much, 
since you can't decipher it. One expert, for example, 
examined a hospital bill for a person who was charged more than 
$30,000 for an outpatient procedure. Many of the services on 
the bill were written in a language that only a coding expert could 
understand. One of the items was a "Bairhugger upper body cov," 
with a charge of $77.55. The same hospital bill contained the 
following additional items and associated charges: Versed 1 
MG/ML 2CC VIA-$11.37; Lactated Ringers 2B2324-$189.00; 
Valve IV-$7.15; Pack Custom Cysto-$58.00; Set Tur-$35.35.53 
As the Aged Parent of one of us lamented, "every emergency room we've 
ever been in, every hospital stay we've had, particularly since our retirement, 
has reduced us to helplessness as far as costs were concerned, choice of 
49 Doe v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, 46 SW3d 191, 194 (Tenn 2001). 
50 Hospital charge masters are described in Gerard Anderson, From "Soak the Rich" to 
"Soak the Poor": Recent Trends in Hospital Pricing, 26 Health Affairs 780, 786 (2007); 
Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of 
Secrecy, 25 Health Affairs 57, 58-59 (2006); Allen Dobson, et al, Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission, A Study of Hospital Charge Setting Practices (2005), online at 
http:/ /www.medpac.gov/publications/contractor_reports/Dec05_Charge_setting.pdf (visited 
Feb 10, 2009). For examples, see http://www.treas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/. 
51 On the impossibility of all this, see Hall and Schneider, 106 MichL Rev at 643 (cited 
in note 22). 
52 Ha T. Tu and Jessica H. May, Self-Pay Markets In Health Care: Consumer 
Nirvana Or Caveat Emptor?, Health Affairs w217, w223 (2007 - Web Exclusive), online at 
http:// content.healthaffairs.org/ cgifcontent/full/hlthaff.26.2.w217v1/DC1 (visited Feb 11, 
2009). 
53 Anderson, 26 Health Affairs at 786 (cited in note 50). 
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hospitals, and choice of the physicians who treated us once we were 
immured." 
In short, prices are so complex and dynamic that information about them 
hardly exists. It has not been compiled, cannot easily be compiled, and cannot 
be reliably analyzed. No wonder it is little provided.54 No wonder attempts 
have far to go before usable information is readily provided. 55 
Quality information is as elusive as price information. Reinhardt gloomily 
concludes that "[i]nformation on the quality of care is generally unavailable 
or not trustworthy. Not even the infection or complication rates experienced 
in hospitals are publicly known."56 One study found that ''[l]ess than one-
third of adults in any plan type reported that their health plans provided them 
with information on either the quality or the cost of their doctors or their 
hospitals .... "57 The scant information on quality in the media or on Internet 
sites "typically consists of mysteriously weighted aggregate indexes that 
obscure the detailed information patients would need in competitive 
market."58 There are only "very limited opportunities to learn about the 
health outcomes achieved by particular physicians and hospitals."59 For 
example, the Association of State Medical Board Executive Directors offers 
"information on physicians' education, malpractice judgments, and 
disciplinary histories." One employers' group in the Northwest "publishes a 
study of patient satisfaction with medical groups and physician networks" 
which "ranks groups and networks on patient satisfaction, ease of getting 
referrals, and their records of keeping blood pressure and cholesterol under 
control and counseling patients on preventive care."60 This is better than 
nothing, but how much health would you wager on such spotty and delphic 
data? 
Like price information, quality information is wickedly hard to assemble. 
Measuring quality is tricky. Many facts that look like evidence of a doctor's 
proficiency or a hospital's reliability turn treacherous on examination. Even 
mortality rates depend on much besides the quality of care. For instance, 
local hospitals often turf patients with ominous prognoses out to tertiary-care 
centers. So the Crooked Creek Community Hospital's mortality statistics 
could look better than the Cleveland Clinic's even while the former offered 
worse care. 
54 
"[F]ew of these initiatives provide health plan enrollees the data they might need to 
make informed choices among available providers or treatments." Mark Merlis, National 
Health Policy Forum, Health Care Price Transparency and Price Competition (2007), online at 
http:/ /www.nhpf.org/libraryjbackground-papers/BP _PriceTransparency_03-28-07.pdf 
(visited Feb 11, 2009). 
55 Perhaps consumers shouldn't even want this information published, since 
publication of prices might inhibit discounts. See Margaret K. Kyle and David B. Ridley, 
Would Greater Transparency and Uniformity of Health Care Prices Benefit Poor Patients? 26 
Health Affairs 1384 (2007); Paul B. Ginsburg, Shopping for Price in Medical Care, 26 Health 
Affw208 (2007); Symposium, 23 Frontiers of Health Service Management 3 (2007). 
56 Reinhardt, 26 J Health Politics, Policy & L at 987 (cited in note 18). 
57 Fronstin and Collins, 315 EBRI Issue Brief at 29 (cited in note 23). 
58 Reinhardt, 26 J Health Politics, Policy & L at 986-87 (cited in note 18). 
59 Deborah Haas-Wilson, Arrow and the Information Market Failure in Health Care: 
The Changing Content and Sources of Health Care Information, 26 J Health Politics, Policy & 
L 1031, 1040 (2001). 
60 Id at 1041. 
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Even experts quarrel about measures of quality. For example, "the 
National Committee for Quality Assurance found that the 'average' health 
plan provided 61.9 percent of appropriate beta-blocker drugs to patients who 
suffered a heart attack. Plans ranged between 15 percent and 100 percent on 
this indicator." So far so good. But is "a high favorable score on this count ... 
evidence of overall high quality or of a shift of resources to this medical 
priority at the expense of others, perhaps those left unmeasured in formal 
surveys"?61 
There is more. To seek out and interpret quality data, consumers must 
realize that quality varies. Many consumers do not. "[R]esearch suggests that 
most consumers do not believe clinical quality varies significantly across 
doctors, hence the low consumer demand for clinical quality report cards. "62 
For example, "[m]any industry observers express concern that LASIK is 
regarded as a commodity by some consumers - leading them to shop only on 
price - when provider quality, in their opinion, varies considerably." LASIK 
may be "relatively simple surgery with low complication rates, but for patients 
whose eyes have certain 'problem' characteristics (for example, abnormal 
topography, large pupils, thin corneas), quality differences can be critical."63 
In short, even the most basic information consumers need to buy these 
expensive and vital products - information about cost and quality - is often 
inaccessible even to experts. Nor is adequate information readily compiled, 
given the obstacles to ascertaining and amassing it, the reluctance of sources 
of information to publish it, the Everest of relevant information, and the 
uncertainty about which information is actually useful, and how to use it. 
Things get no better when we move from choosing plans and providers to 
choosing treatments. Even experts often lack good information about 
treatments. "Evidence-based medicine" is today's watchword, but there is 
decent evidence for only a fraction (albeit a large fraction) of medicine. 
Indeed, the great fact about the "information" doctors reason from and 
present to patients is its insistent uncertainty. Uncertainty "is clinically 
commonplace. "64 Medicine "is engulfed and infiltrated by uncertainty. "65 
Physicians practice "in a sea of doubt and uncertainty,"66 so that "judgments 
must inevitably be made on the doctor's personal experience of past cases; the 
comparison of the present size, sound or feel of something with what is 
remembered; and on what a clinician believes to be the problem, based 
sometimes on very scanty evidence."67 
All this is uncertainty about how to treat patients. But consumerist 
patients need still another datum - treatments' cost-effectiveness. This is 
61 Brown, 56 Med Care Res & Rev at 160 (cited in note 36). 
62 HaT. Tu and Johanna R. Lauer, Word of Mouth and Physician Riferrals Still Drive 
Health Care Provider Choice, 9 Center for Studying Health System Change 1, 5 (2008), online 
at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/1028/ (visited Feb 11, 2009). 
63 Tu and May, Health Affairs (2007- Web Exclusive) at w222 (cited in note 52). 
&<. Charles L. Bosk, Occupational Rituals in Patient Management, 303 NEJM 71, 72 
(1980). 
65 Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 166 (Free Press, 1984). 
66 Eric J. Cassell, The Changing Concept of the Ideal Physician, Daedalus 185, 186 
(1986). 
67 Id at 191. On clinical uncertainty, see Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy at 48-75 
(cited in note 20). 
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even less available than information about efficacy. Managed care 
organizations have been trying to generate and acquire such data for years, 
with incomplete success. Can patients inspire something better? 
In sum, wise decisions depend on adequate information. In this section, 
we have seen that often such information does not exist, has not been 
gathered, is kept private, or cannot practically be collected. 
B. WHENCE COMETH INFORMATION? 
Once more suppose away all the problems we've been considering. 
Suppose consumers have real choices of plans, providers, and treatments. 
Suppose cost and quality information about plans, providers, and treatments 
is offered in useful form. Who will give consumers that information, and how 
might the messenger affect the message's availability, quality, and credibility? 
Ordinary vendors advertise their wares. Unfortunately the incentives that 
inspire advertising also inspire hype. Furthermore, the beauties of our own 
work always outshine its flaws. Consumers expect and law tolerates some 
sales puffery. So when even scrupulous health plans and providers proclaim 
their virtues or relate their results, they accentuate the positive. "[N]o one 
denies that marketing agents [of medical plans], eager to boost a plan's 
enrollment, their own commissions, or both, sometimes put consumers' minds 
at ease by shading facts."68 But how are consumers to discount for the hype? 
Similar problems are inevitable when patients purchase treatments. One 
canary in this mine is LASIK surgery, which consumers buy directly from 
providers who advertise. "Misleading advertisements have been a recurring 
problem with some LASIK providers, most notably discounters; federal and 
state regulators have taken action against some providers - and investigated 
many more - for making unfounded claims about price and quality. "69 
Another canary is direct-to-consumer drug advertising. One study 
concludes that these ads "have limited educational value and may oversell the 
benefits of drugs in ways that might conflict with promoting population 
health. "7o Similarly, Lyles believes that the ''blend of promotion and 
information has produced more prescription drug awareness than knowledge 
- it has been largely ineffective in educating patients with medical conditions 
about the medications for those conditions:•n And not just ineffective in 
educating, but mis-educating. Advertisements for drugs are regulated, but 
their information ''has frequently been found to be biased or misleading in 
68 Brown, 56 Med Care Res & Rev at 149 (cited in note 36). 
69 Tu and May, Health Affairs (2007 - Web Exclusive) at w221 (cited in note 52). 
LASIK "is widely regarded as the self-pay market with the most favorable conditions for 
consumer shopping: It is an elective, nonurgent, simple procedure," so consumers should have 
time and capacity to shop for it, "screening exams are not required to obtain initial price 
quotes, which keeps the dollar and time costs of shopping reasonable; and easy entry of 
providers (ophthalmologists) into the market has stimulated competition and kept prices 
down." 
70 Dominick L. Frosch, et al, Creating Demand for Prescription Drugs: A Content 
Analysis of Television Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 5 Annals Family Med 6 (2007). 
71 Alan Lyles, Direct Marketing of Pharmaceuticals to Consumers, 23 Annual Rev 
Public Health 73 (2002). 
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regulatory and academic evaluations. "72 Consumers tested after seeing ads 
"correctly answered an average of 59 percent of the true/false questions," 
fewer when the questions were about risk, and fewer "if the information had 
been given in text, with or without accompanying audio, rather than in audio 
only .... "73 
Hospital ads may be yet more vacuous (if blessedly rarer). An analysis of 
over 300 hospital websites said that their information was "rudimentary" and 
that "few of the designated measures were valid and reliable measures of 
quality."74 
Even when providers are compelled to disclose information, they can 
usually beautifY it. When health plans had to disclose the way their doctors 
were paid, "almost none" of their statements mentioned "the potential 
negative impact that incentive arrangements might have on physician 
behavior." They more often put "incentives in a positive light," by saying, for 
example, that the incentives rewarded better care (as perhaps they did).75 
All this makes vendors unreliable, as consumers know. But how 
unreliable? Vendors paint pretty portraits, but they also paint some warts, 
not least because they want repeat business and good word-of-mouth, neither 
of which comes from deceived customers. So how does the consumer 
distinguish reliable from dubious vendors? Discount favorable information 
from any vendor? Discount it they do. For example, "[s]everal focus groups 
have found that consumers particularly distrust information that comes from 
the plans themselves, or from their employers because they believe they are 
being 'marketed' .... "76 Yet too much discounting is as bad as too little. 
Consumers of all kinds are especially moved by recommendations from 
friends and family. And so "when it comes to plan choice, consumers say they 
most trust the advice of their doctors, friends, and family .... "77 However, 
those recommendations are unsystematic, and lay evaluations of technical 
services are unreliable.78 So consumers may trust most those who evaluate 
quality worst. 
72 Steven Morgan, et al, The Economics of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of 
Prescription Advertising of Prescription-Only Drugs: Prescribed to Improve Consumer 
Welfare?, 8 J Health Services Res & Policy 237 (2003). 
73 Kimberly A. Kaphingst and William DeJong, The Educational Potential of Direct-To-
consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 23 Health Affairs 143, 145 (2004). 
74 David S. Zingmond, et al, Information Superhighway or Billboards by the Roadside? 
An Analysis of Hospital Web Sites, 175 Western J Med 385 (2001). 
75 Mark A. Hall, The Theory and Practice of Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives, 65 L 
& Contemp Prob 207, 227 (2002). Similarly, lending disclosure requirements may "create 
incentives for lenders to draft contract terms that ... continue to obscure the actual contract 
terms." Susan Block-Lieb and Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: 
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 Texas L Rev 
1481, 1560 (2005-2006). 
76 Amy B. Bernstein and Anne K. Gauthier, Choices in Health Care: U'hatAre They and 
U'hatAre They Worth?, 56 Med Care Res & Rev 5, 13 (1999). 
77 James S. Lubalin and Lauren D. Harris-Kojetin What Do Consumers Want and Need 
to Know in Making Health Care Choices?, 56 Med Care Res & Rev 67, 72 (1999). 
78 For example, B. McKinstry, et al, Do Patients and Expert Doctors Agree on the 
Assessment of Consultation Skills?, 21 Family Practice 75 (2004), found "no meaningful 
association" between patients' and experts' assessments of doctors' skills. John T. Chang, et al, 
Patients' Global Ratings of Their Health Care Are Not Associated with the Technical Quality of 
Their Care, 144 Annals Intern Med 665, 671 (2006), "found that patient reports about 
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Ideally, then, consumers need sounder sources. When you buy flooring, 
you check Fine Homebuilding. When you buy a handsaw, you check Fine 
Woodworking. Will a Fine Health Care appear? Consumer Reports does rate 
health plans, US News eJ World Report does rate hospitals, and Internet sites 
are arising.79 But when markets are so fragmented, could Fine Health Care 
evaluate each market thoroughly enough? FHC would also struggle with the 
complexities we've been describing. Furthermore, the institutions FHC 
evaluated would game the system, just as law schools do with U.S. News and 
World Report. Anderson, for example, says California has tried to proffer 
useful information by comparing "the prices of only twenty-five items on the 
chargemaster." However, "hospitals can lower prices for just those twenty-five 
items."80 So is a really useful FHC possible? And if so, would consumers 
really use it? 
Information about everything does bubble up everywhere on the Internet. 
But it must be (1) consulted, (2) reliable, and (3) workable: onerous 
requirements. For example, people over 75 "were much less likely to report 
use of the Internet for health than their juniors."81 And, for example, the best 
guide to Medicare drug cards in 2005 was the government's website. But 
three quarters of the prospective beneficiaries had never used the Internet, 
and "of the 23 percent who had used it, only 6 percent had visited the 
website."82 
Well, the Luddite old will eventually be replaced by the cyber young. But 
they still must locate sites and separate wheat-sites from chaff-sites. 
Inevitably, chaff proliferates; studies repeatedly find Internet information 
dicey.83 "[O]nly a few of the web pages" one study reviewed "gave complete 
and accurate information for such a common and widely discussed condition 
as fever in children." The advice those sites gave parents about children's 
fevers was "often incomplete and partly misleading" and inadequate to 
overcome parents' ''beliefs and established practices."84 
In addition, making Internet information usable is hard. One Medicare 
expert tried to help "a parent, who was taking four prescription drugs, use the 
[government] website to find the best card." It took "forty-two 'clicks' or word 
entries to get an answer." The expert had to supply data "about such things as 
each medication used and its dosage, current drug spending, and pharmacy 
interpersonal quality were distinct from technical quality of care as measured by medical 
records and patient interviews." 
79 For a brief description, see J.D. Kleinke, Vaporware.com: The Failed Promise of the 
Health Care Internet: Why the Internet Will Be the Next Big Thing Not To Fix the U.S. Health 
Care System, 19 Health Affairs 57, 66-67 (2000 ). 
80 Anderson, 26 Health Affairs at 786 (cited in note 50). 
81 Laurence Baker, et al, Use of the Internet and E-Mail For Health Care Information: 
Results From a National Survey, 289 JAMA 2400, 2402 (2003). 
82 Yaniv Hanoch and Thomas Rice, Can Limiting Choice Increase Social Welfare? The 
Elderly and Health Insurance, 84 Milbank Q 37, 54 (2006). 
83 Baker, et al, 289 JAMA at 2405 (cited in note 81). 
84 Piero lmpicciatore, et al, Reliability of Health Information for the Public on the 
World Wide Web: Systematic Survey of Advice on Managing Fever in Children at Home, 314 
British Med J 1875, 1878 (1997). Similarly downbeat is Angela Fagerlin, et al, Patient 
Education Materials About the Treatment of Early-Stage Prostate Cancer: A Critical Review, 
140 Annals Intern Med 721, 724 (2004). 
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preferences."85 Not only is this laborious (and irksome, since entry errors are 
almost unavoidable), but who has such facts easy to hand?86 
Even were the Internet widely used, how consumerist would the results 
be? "Many have argued that patients using the Web to find providers will 
finally bring price-sensitivity to health care consumption . . . . The exact 
opposite is more likely to occur . . . . Not only will people never seek the 
lowest bidder when it comes to their own physical and emotional well-being; 
they will actively seek out and select the highest bidder, presuming (usually 
correctly) that higher cost connotes higher quality .... "87 Furthermore, health 
care companies advertise because it moves their products, partly by increasing 
demand. Increased demand rarely lowers overall health care costs. 
Another way to assess the Internet's usefulness is to ask how it helps with 
other major choices. Try using the retirement-planning sites of Fidelity, 
Vanguard, TI.AA and the like. Their instructions for entering data drip with 
ambiguity, their assumptions are unannounced, even a single program gives 
wildly different counsel with slight variations in entries, and different sites 
give different advice even when you try to keep entries consistent. If 
providing information on the Internet were easy, surely these well-motivated 
institutions could do better. And if they can't, who can? 
In the preceding section, we said that information about health purchases 
is often unavailable. In this section, we asked who will deliver the information 
that is available. Messengers are generally fewer than in other purchases and 
less reliable and harder to evaluate than consumers' usual informants. 
IV. WILL DOCTORS DISCUSS AND USE COST INFORMATION? 
Should you begin by discussing fees, you will suggest to the patient 
either that you will go away and leave him if no agreement be reached, 
or that you will neglect him and not prescribe any immediate 
treatment .... For I consider such a worry to be harmful to a troubled 
patient, particularly if the disease be acute. For the quickness of the 
disease, offering no opportunity for turning back, spurs on the good 
physician not to seek his profit but rather to lay hold on reputation. 
Hippocrates 
Precepts 
Once again, assume away all the problems we have discussed so far. 
Suppose the information consumers need is assembled and is proffered by 
trustworthy messengers consumers actually trust. Will doctors and patients 
then discuss costs, and will doctors help patients economize? 
85 Hanoch and Rice, 84 Milbank Qat 54 (cited in note 82). 
86 
"Accessing health information using search engines and simple search terms is not 
efficient. Coverage of key information ... is poor and inconsistent .... High reading levels are 
required to comprehend Web-based health information." Gretchen K. Berland, et al, Health 
Information on the Internet: Accessibility, Quality, and Readability in English and Spanish, 
285 JAMA 2612 (2001). 
87 Kleinke, 19 Health Affairs at 67 (cited in note 79). 
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A. STIMULATING DISCUSSIONS OF COSTS 
Consumerism may seem especially plausible for treatment decisions, since 
doctors can help patients make them. Some patients - especially the poor -
already get cost guidance. But for consumerism to work, doctors must 
routinely discuss costs, since otherwise patients cannot identify economies. 
So will doctors and patients talk about the cost of treatment choices? 
They might. First, patients might take the initiative and ask about cheaper 
treatments or foregoing treatment. This happens. It should be encouraged. 
But patients often do not realize such a question makes sense. Furthermore, 
patients report a "wide variety ofbarriers" to discussing costs.88 Who wants to 
bring up money? Even in an art gallery, embarrassment might inhibit you 
from asking about price. Partly this is because you probably can't afford the 
Paul Strand you want, just as you might not be able to afford the treatment 
the doctor proposes. 
Furthermore, you come to the doctor "sick, anxious, and intimidated. So 
you let the doctor set the boundaries and tone of your relationship."89 You 
want doctors' approval, confidence, and concern. Questioning a 
recommendation and demanding a cheaper one rarely strike patients as canny 
tactics, especially when physicians are selling their own services. Thus in one 
study only 12% of the subjects had ever negotiated with a provider for a lower 
price.90 One sophisticated patient we know thought it "a little difficult" to ask 
a doctor she had just met about price. She feared raising questions about 
"respect" for the doctor and getting "off on the wrong foot." When we said 
that "you don't want your doctor thinking badly about you," she replied, "Yeah, 
getting revenge somehow, perhaps."91 Further, patients are notoriously bad at 
raising the subjects they really want to discuss. Finally, sickness can be 
painful, exhausting, debilitating, disorienting, terrifying, isolating. People so 
afflicted lack the energy and acuity to ask smart questions and demand smart 
answers. 
If patients won't reliably bring up cost, will doctors? This is crucial, 
because physicians notoriously dominate conversations with patients.92 Yet 
physicians little relish conversations about prices.93 Indeed, "the literature has 
only recently begun to address patient-provider communication about health 
care costs." On "first pass, it appears that little communication of this type is 
going on. "94 Physicians advertise rarely, advertise fees less, and post no 
88 G. Caleb Alexander, et al, Barriers to Patient-Physician Communication About Out-
of-Pocket Costs, 856 J Gen Intern Med 19 (2004). 
89 Hall and Schneider, 106 MichL Rev at 655 (cited in note 22). 
90 Sara R. Collins, et al, The Commonwealth Fund, Gaps in 
Health Insurance: An All-American Problem 20 (2006), online at 
http:/ /www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Collins_gapshltins_920.pdf. 
9
' Hall and Schneider, 106 Mich L Rev at 655-56 (cite in note 22). 
92 Even when doctors spoke with sophisticated patients (San Francisco AIDS patients) 
about an important topic (CPR), conversations were brief, doctors did most of the talking, and 
they "dominated the discussions." James A. Tulsky, et al, How Do Medical Residents Discuss 
Resuscitation with Patients?, 10 J Gen Intern Med 436 (1995). 
93 For a historical view of the ethics and practice of fees, see Fridolf Kudlien, Medicine 
as a "Liberal Art" and the Question of the Physician's Income, 31 J History Med 448 (1976). 
94 Alex D. Federman, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: The Status of Doctor-Patient 
Communication About Health Care Costs, 164 Arch Intern Med 1723,1723 (2004). 
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prices.95 Dr. Hippocrates, quoted in our epigraph, set the example of 
reluctance to talk about money.96 Stein describes a "taboo in official American 
health culture: namely, a prohibition upon allowing the physician to appear 
concerned with financial matters." Stein thinks people "'selling' their services 
are loathe to affix a price tag to services at the time of the transaction or as an 
official precondition to 'delivering' them. Somehow it would be immoral to do 
so."97 And perhaps physicians (relatively rich) are embarrassed to reveal fees 
patients (relatively poor) may find incomprehensibly high and intolerably 
burdensome. 
Research confirms that doctors and patients do not regularly discuss 
costs. "Four hundred eight patients (85%) reported they had never discussed 
their out-of-pocket costs with their physician. This group of 408 patients 
included 56 of the 77 patients (73%) who reported cost-related medication 
nonadherence during the previous 12 months."98 Likewise, only a tenth of 
another group of patients remembered being told what care would cost.99 
Some data look more encouraging. Fronstin and Collins found that 
people in consumer plans were likelier to talk with their doctor about 
treatment options and costs and to ask their doctor to recommend a cheaper 
drug: "[a]bout 2 in 5 said they had done this, compared with thirty percent of 
those in more comprehensive plans."100 Nevertheless, these patients were 
asked whether they had ever discussed cost, not whether such discussions 
were routine and productive. 
Even if doctors balk at discussing their own fees, might they discuss the 
costs of services and supplies they order from others? Perhaps not. For 
instance: "Physician-patient discussions about new medication cost and other 
acquisition issues, especially medication affordability, occur infrequently."101 
This is true even where discussion seems needed: "Few chronically ill patients 
who are at risk of or experiencing problems related to prescription medication 
costs report that their clinicians had asked them about possible medication 
payment difficulties. "102 
95 See, for example, Berkeley Rice, How to Market Your 
Practice, Med Econ 53 (Mar 4, 2005), online at 
http:// medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/memag/Medical +Practice+ Management:+ Pra 
ctice+ Pointers/Practice-Pointers-How-to-market-your-
practice/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/148876 (visited Feb 13, 2009). "[P]hysician price 
advertising continues to be quite rare," and "physicians are strongly opposed to price 
advertising." John A. Rizzo & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Advertising and the Price, Quantity, and 
Quality of Primary Care Physician Services, 27 J Human Resources 381, 388-89, n 12 (1992). 
96 John Fabre, Medicine as a Profession: Hip, Hip, Hippocrates: Extracts from The 
Hippocratic Doctor, 315 British Med J 1669 (1997). 
97 Howard F. Stein, The Money Taboo in American Medicine, 7 Med Anthropology 1, 11 
(1983). 
98 G. Caleb Alexander et al, Patient-Physician Communication About Out-of-Pocket 
Costs, 290 JAMA 953, 955 (2003). 
99 Thomas P. O'Toole et al, Full Disclosure of Financial Costs and Options to Patients: 
The Roles of Race, Age, Health Insurance, and Usual Source for Care, 15 J Health Care Poor & 
Underserved 52, 56 (2004). 
100 Fronstin and Collins, 315 EBRI Issue Brief at 33 (cited in note 23). 
101 Deijung M. Tarn et al, Physician Communication About the Cost and Acquisition of 
Newly Prescribed Medications, 12 Am J Managed Care 657, 657 (2006). 
102 Michele Heisler eta!, Clinician Identification of Chronically Ill Patients Who Have 
Problems Paying for Prescription Medications, 116 Am J Med 753, 753 (2004). 
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One major problem is that doctors often do not know prices. Half a 
century ago doctors were "seldom informed about the price" of drugs.103 A 
quarter of a century ago "doctors seldom ha[d] an accurate sense of drug 
costs" and when asked "about common drug prices, they reveal[ed] ignorance 
more often than knowledge."104 Today doctors "consistently overestimate[e] 
the cost of inexpensive products and underestimate[ e) the cost of expensive 
ones."105 Even primary care and internal medicine physicians are "no more 
knowledgeable about costs than their family practice, geriatrics, pediatrics, 
and neurology colleagues were a decade ago." Eighty percent of them "were 
often unaware of actual drug costs, and most underestimated the cost of 
common brand-name medications we inquired about."106 
Furthermore, physicians cannot know what treatments cost until they 
know what treatments are required. But, for example, primary-care 
physicians often forward patients to specialists and hospitals with little idea 
what the cost will be.107 Thus one national survey found primary-care doctors 
"unprepared to advise patients on the costs of medical care, particularly 
radiologic studies, specialty consultations, and hospitalizations."106 
In addition, most doctors have patients with different insurers which 
negotiate fees "in a tumultuous market that regards prices as trade secrets. 
One Harvard surgeon's group has a six-hundred page 'master fee schedule' 
with 'twenty-four columns across the top, one for each of the major insurance 
plans, and, running down the side, a row for every service a doctor can bill 
for."' Even a "superb office staff might not know who would pay what until 
the insurer completed claims 'adjudication.'"109 Yet 
103 Herman Miles Somers and Anne Ramsay Somers, Doctors, Patients, and Health 
Insurance 209, 209 (1961). 
104 Peter Temin, Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United States 103, 105 
(1980). 
105 G.M. Allan et a!, Physician Awareness of Drug Cost: A Systematic Review, 4 PLoS 
Med 1486, 1486 (2007). 
106 Reichert et al, 160 Arch Intern Med at 2802 (cited in note 42). Nor did a third of 
them realize that Medicare did not (then) cover medications. 
107 See generally John D. Goodson, Unintended Consequences of Resource-Based 
Relative Value Scale Reimbursement, 298 JAMA 2308 (2007). 
108 Giridhar Mallya eta!, 14 Am J of Managed Care at 666 (cited in 25). 
109 Mark A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, 106 Mich L Rev at 657 (cited in note 22) 
(quoting Atul Gawande, Piecework: Medicine's Money Problem, New Yorker, Apr. 4, 2005, at 
44). 
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clearing a typical insurance claim involves, for starters, the 
following queries: (1) Is the patient a member of the plan? 
(2) Is this particular service covered by the patient's benefit plan? 
(3) Is there secondary insurance that should cover this service? 
( 4) Is this service related to an incident that may be subrogatable 
to a workers' comp, disability, or accident event? (5) Is this 
service consistent with the patient's clinical diagnosis, history, 
age, and sex? ( 6) Is the service, if covered, medically necessary? 
(7) Has the service, if covered, been preauthorized? (8) Is this 
submitting provider qualified to provide this service? (9) Is the 
provider a member of the network? (10) How much do we pay 
this particular provider for this particular service? (11) Has the 
patient's deductible or major medical been met this year? 
(12) Did the patient pay upfront, and who are we reimbursing, 
patient or provider?110 
Can doctors be persuaded to discuss money regularly? Altering doctors' 
preferences and practices is hard even where change would benefit patients 
clinically.m Most relevantly, managed care organizations have for years 
begged doctors to economize in exactly the ways consumerism contemplates. 
Those efforts provoked vehement resistance, disappointing improvement, and 
numerous retreats by health plans. 
Can the law stimulate cost discussions? When the law wants to change 
sellers' interactions with consumers, it reaches first for mandated disclosure. 
Asked to change doctors' conversations with patients, the law reaches first for 
informed consent. But how would informed consent work here? Plaintiffs 
would be claiming that, properly informed, they would have foregone a test or 
chosen a cheaper treatment. But if doctors are giving reasonable advice, 
patients could not easily prove they would have rejected it. Nor will damages 
often be juicy enough to induce contingency fee lawyers to take such cases.112 
Patients might refuse to pay for treatments they would have rejected if 
properly informed. The claim would resemble that of customers whose 
brokers churned their accounts. This is doctrinally neat but practically messy. 
Patients would have to realize that they had been denied information about 
cheaper care and would have chosen it. A lawyer would ordinarily have to 
help formulate the claim and make it stick, since no billing office would listen 
to that kind of whining from patients.113 
110 Kleinke, 19 Health Affairs at 61 (cited in note 79). 
111 For an introduction to this unexpectedly challenging problem see Gro Jamtvedt eta!, 
Audit and Feedback: Effects on Professional Practice and Health Care Outcomes, 1 Cochrane 
Database Syst Rev 259 (2006); Peter J. Greco and John M. Eisenberg, Changing Physicians' 
Practices, 17 NEJM 1271, 1271 (1993); Jacqueline Kosecoff et a!, Effects of the National 
Institutes of Health Consensus Development Program on Physician Practice, 258 JAMA 2708, 
2712 (1987); Lee A. Green and Colleen M. Seifert, Translation of Research Into Practice: Why 
We Can't "Just Do It", JAm Bd Family Prac 541, 541 (2005); Lee Green and David R. Mehr, 
What Alters Physicians' Decisions to Admit to the Coronary Care Unit?, 45 J Family Prac 219, 
223 (1997). 
112 For a helpful discussion of this issue, see E. H. Morreim, High-Deductible Health 
Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges from Tort and Contract, 59 Vanderbilt L Rev 1207, 1224-
32 (2006). 
113 For more on the difficulties patients face resisting medical bills, see Hall and 
Schneider, 106 Mich L Rev at 643 (cited in note 22). 
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In sum, doctors and patients sometimes discuss costs, but not as often nor 
thoroughly as consumerism would need. Promoting such conversations is 
onerous, and the law is ill-suited to the task. 
B. WILL DOCTORS EMBRACE THRIFT? 
Suppose now that doctors and patients do discuss costs. Those 
conversations will be bootless if doctors aren't committed to economies, since 
doctors shape - often make - patients' choices about tests and treatments. AI; 
one court said, the doctor 
dictates what brand [of drugs] the patient is to buy ... [and] 
orders the amount of drugs and prescribes the quantity to be 
consumed. In other words, the patient is a captive consumer. 
There is no other profession or business where a member thereof 
can dictate to a consumer what brand he must buy, what amount 
he must buy, and how fast he must consume it and how much he 
must pay with the further condition to the consumer that any 
failure to fully comply must be at the risk of his own health .... 
[T]he patient then becomes a totally captive consumer and the 
doctor has a complete monopoly.114 
And when patients enter a hospital, the doctor's influence over patients' 
expenditures intensifies. "Patients rarely abandon doctors, reject doctors' 
recommendations, or demand second opinions."115 So if doctors don't help 
patients economize - if they don't lead their patients to economize - patients 
will be sore pressed to economize intelligently. 
Much in doctors' culture, training, and situation dulls economizing zeal. 
First, we got to consumerism because doctors had little reason to control costs 
and much reason to drive them up. The more services doctors sold and the 
more they charged for a service, the wealthier they got. In a simpler day, 
doctors had fewer services to offer and modest market power, and fee-for-
service medicine could be kept within patients' ability to pay, especially since 
doctors charged the poor less than the rich.116 When health insurance became 
a basic benefit and when (over the "socialized medicine" laments of organized 
medicine) Medicare and Medicaid were instituted, fee-for-service remained 
standard. Fees, however, kept growing even while doctors' provision of 
services did not always correlate with need117 and doctors used some of their 
114 Magan Medical Clinic v. California State Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal Rptr 
256, 263 (Ct App 1967). 
115 Hall and Schneider, 106 Mich L Rev at 652 (cited in note 22). 
116 For this history, see Mark A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, Learning From the Legal 
History ofBillingfor Medical Fees, 23 J Gen Intern Med 1257 (2008). 
117 
"[M]any studies have suggested ... that physicians' decisions are influenced by a 
wide variety of factors that are unrelated to a patient's specific medical problem. These factors 
include practice setting, degree of specialization, and physician age." Lachlan Forrow et al, 
Science, Ethics, and the Making of Clinical Decisions: Implications for Risk Factor 
Intervention, 259 JAMA 3161, 3165 (1988). Furthermore, "[w]ide variations in the incidence 
of medical and surgical services are the norm, not the exception," Bradford H. Gray, The Profit 
Motive and Patient Care: The Changing Accountability of Doctors and Hospitals 252 (Harvard 
U Press, 1991) (emphasis in original), although much of this variation is concentrated in areas 
where there is professional disagreement about the treatment. Further, "as much as 25 
percent or more of expenditures for medical care is for unnecessary or inappropriate services." 
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market power to sustain their incomes. us This dynamic drove us to managed 
care and still operates, even ifless universally. 
Furthermore, organized medicine and many physicians resented managed 
care's challenge to their authority, and they remain resentful.n9 "Under cover 
of the managed care backlash, physicians and hospitals began to reassert their 
prerogatives. With the erosion of stringent cost controls, physicians gained 
greater leverage in clinical decisions. "120 As Hyman bluntly argues, "The 
medical profession wants to regain its ability to dictate the terms of trade with 
regard to cost and quality."121 In short, organized medicine and many doctors 
have fought long, hard, and bitterly to preserve their unconstrained authority 
in general and their ability to avoid cost controls particularly.122 
Dr. Bloche takes the point further. He writes that by the early 1960s, 
physicians had "won consumers' confidence" and that many physicians "took 
opportunistic advantage by acquiring ownership interests in hospitals, clinical 
laboratories, and other health care businesses." Doctors' "[a]nticommercial 
norms" eroded, so that doctors "now routinely advertise, accept discounted 
fees from managed health plans, take ownership interests in facilities 
financially affected by clinical utilization patterns, and sign contracts that 
reward them financially for withholding care."123 
Doctors, then, have interests that disincline them to make cost-
containment a priority. These are only interests and only disinclinations. 
Many individual physicians lack or ignore those interests, and many restrain 
or reject the disinclination. Furthermore, organized medicine is more 
disorganized and various than ever, so its ultimate reaction to consumerism is 
unpredictable. 
Doctors' doubts about cost-containment are reinforced by admirable 
aspects of their culture. Doctors are moved by craft pride. Their norms call 
them to provide the best care available, to follow the best practices, to apply 
the gold standard.124 One reason many doctors loathe managed care is that 
Id at 253. For vivid demonstrations of how much medical practices vary geographically, see 
John E. Wennberg et a!, Are Hospital Services Rationed in New Haven or Over-Utilized in 
Boston?, 1987 Lancet 1185; Mark R. Chassin et al, Variations in the Use of Medical and 
Surgical Services by the Medicare Population, 314 NEJM 285 (1986). 
118 For the background, see Hall and Schneider, 106 Mich L Rev at 643 (cited in note 
22). 
119 
"[P]hysicians provided some of the most vociferous opposition to managed care ... ." 
Jacobson, 47 SLU L Rev at 371 (cited in note 35). 
120 Id at 366. 
121 David A. Hyman, Accountable Managed Care: Should We Be Careful What We Wish 
For?, 32 U Mich J L Reform 785, 801-02 (1999). 
122 Nor can we count on organized medicine for constructive alternatives. "[P]roviders 
have spent too much of their time complaining about managed care and too little time 
considering whether alternatives to existing payment arrangements might make everyone 
better off." David A. Hyman, Medicine in the New Millennium: A Self-Help Guide for the 
Perplexed, 26 Am J L & Med 143, 147 (2000). 
123 M. Gregg Bloche, The Market for Medical Ethics, 26 J Health Politics, Policy & L 
1099, 1108-09 (October 2001). 
124 The depth of their feeling is suggested by their occasional willingness to deceive 
insurance companies to obtain coverage. This superficially appealing but also destructive 
practice is discussed in Rachael M. Werner et al, Lying to Insurance Companies: The Desire to 
Deceive among Physicians and the Public, 4 Am J Bioethics 53 (2004); Victor G. Freeman et 
a!, Lying for Patients: Physician Deception of Third-Party Payers, 159 Arch Intern Med 2263 
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they feel it prevents them from giving that care.125 And doctors are trained in 
"Hippocratic individualism,"~26 a single-minded commitment to the interest of 
the patient seeking help. Much of this benefits patients, and in much of this 
doctors speak for patients. As individuals (if not as members of an insured 
group), patients want all the medical care their doctors think they need. 
Furthermore, doctors' paternalism - less pejoratively, their role -
accustoms them to persuade patients toward health. Patients often need 
persuading. They eat, drink, and smoke; they avoid doctors; they don't buy 
drugs they've been prescribed; they don't take drugs they've bought; they flee 
from burdensome treatment. Inducing patients to cooperate in their own care 
is part of the physician's stock-in-trade and part of what patients expect.127 
Little in all this inspires doctors to save money; much in this arms them to 
resist lowering standards. This commitment may bend to fit economic 
circumstances, but not easily.128 Nevertheless, doctors are pragmatists. They 
want patients to receive the best care, but they are not flatly unwilling to help 
patients save money. Not at all. In our interviews and our work with medical 
colleagues, we encounter many physicians who are warmly anxious to help 
patients who have trouble paying for care.129 Scholarship confirms this. For 
example, three-quarters of the doctors in one national survey routinely 
consider insured patient's out-of-pocket costs in some clinical situations, 
especially when prescribing drugs.130 In one academic medical center, 88% of 
(1999); Matthew K. Wynia et al, Physicians Manipulation of Reimbursement Rules for 
Patients: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 283 JAMA 1858 (2000). 
125 However, 
we have tolerated a sharp dissonance between medical ethics' professed 
adherence to a rule of absolute patient loyalty and the reality of myriad violations 
of the rule. For example, physicians routinely make pragmatic decisions in 
public institutions operating under fixed budgets that may compromise 
individual patients' optimal medical benefit. In clinical practice, physicians 
regularly compromise individual patient welfare to a small but discernible extent 
because of competing demands for their time and limits on available specialized 
facilities and technology. They also comfortably adopt prudent clinical heuristics 
that avoid extravagant expenditures for very small increments of medical benefit. 
Mark A. Hall and Robert A. Berenson, Ethical Practice in Managed Care: A Dose of Realism, 
128 Ann Intern Med 395, 396 (1998). 
126 Robert Zussman, Intensive Care: Medical Ethics and the Medical Profession 192 (U 
Chicago Press, 1992). 
127 Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy 4-9 (cited in note 20). 
128 Gail Weiss, A Patient's Coverage Takes a Back Seat to Clinical Factors, Say Most 
Respondents to our Ethics Policy, Med Economics (Dec 1, 2006) online at 
http:/ /medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/memag/Physician+Surveys:+2006/What-
would-you-do-Testing-and-insurance/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/387515 (visited February 
25, 2009). 
129 See also Samia A. Hurst et a!, Physicians' Responses To Resource Constraints, 165 
Arch Intern Med 639, 641-42 (2005). 
130 Hoangmai H. Pham eta!, Physician Consideration Of Patients' Out-Of-Pocket Costs 
In Making Common Clinical Decisions, 167 Arch Intern Med 663, 663 (2007). In one small 
survey, doctors considered patients' insurance status in 47% of patients' visits. David S. 
Meyers et al, Primary Care Physicians' Perceptions of the Effect of Insurance Status on Clinical 
Decision Making, 4 Ann Fam Med 399, 401 (2006). In another study, 31% of the doctors 
questioned sometimes or often did not offer "a useful service to patients because of health plan 
coverage rules." Matthew K. Wynia et al, Do Physicians Not O.ffer Useful Services Because Of 
Coverage Restrictions?, 22 Health Affairs 190, 190 (2003). 
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the physicians thought patients' costs were important in prescribing, and 71% 
would sacrifice some efficacy to save some money.131 
What is more, doctors may see more realistically than patients that a 
treatment is futile or ineffective. Nor is economy always inimical to health. 
Thus we found in interviews with a convenience sample of seven primary-care 
physicians that doctors are most willing to save money when it promotes 
optimal care, as when a patient is likelier to take prescribed medication if the 
doctor chooses a cheaper even ifless effective drug.132 
In sum, foregoing care to conserve costs conflicts with much that is 
elemental in the training and culture of doctors. It also conflicts with much 
that is elemental in the feelings of patients. They want to save money, but 
they don't want mingy short-term economies at major long-term expense. All 
the conflicting traditions and principles and interests and emotions may leave 
doctors unsure when to press patients to economize and when to press them 
to spend. Pragmatic doctors will, for instance, accede more readily to 
patients' thrift where the goal is controlling symptoms the patient can 
perceive and where long-term harm is unlikely. After all, patients ordinarily 
are motivated by their illness itself to control arthritis pain, or to take 
medications that slow the onset of dementia. 
But where symptoms aren't obvious and where mistakes may be 
irreparable (controlling blood pressure, cholesterol, and blood sugar are 
classics) doctors more readily urge treatments on patients. Doctors we 
interviewed gave examples that ranged from persuasion to manipulation to 
coercion. One doctor told a woman who balked at a mammogram that he was 
scheduling one anyway. Another called a taxi to take a patient to the hospital 
to prevent her from going home. Yet another doctor enlisted family members 
in convincing recalcitrant patients. Still another doctor asked a patient who 
wouldn't leave her grandchild to come in for an exam, ''who will take of your 
grandchild if you die?" In sum, doctors dance a delicate dance to 
accommodate patients' ambivalent wants and ambiguous needs. 
But if consumerism prevailed, might doctors decide that a reputation for 
economy would attract patients? Might doctors recognize a social duty to 
cabin costs? Perhaps, but managed care's experience is not encouraging. 
Even doctors who tolerated managed care did not respond as consumerism 
expects. They did not so much adjust recommendations to each patient's 
individual situation as change their style of practice across the board.133 
Economists celebrated this "spill-over effect," but consumerism expects 
131 Reichert et al, 160 Arch Intern Med at 2800 (cited in note 42). 
132 Elizabeth A. Mort et al, Physician Response To Patient Insurance Status in 
Ambulatory Care Clinical Decision-Making: Implications For Quality Of Care, 34 Med Care 
783, 783 (1996), for example, finds that patients' insurance status influences doctors' clinical 
decisions more for discretionary than for necessary services. 
133 Sherry Glied and Joshua Graff Zivin, How Do Doctors Behave When Some (But Not 
All) of Their Patients are in Managed Care?, 21 J Health Economics 337, 353 (2002). See also 
Rajesh Balkrishnan et al, Capitation Payment, Length of Visit, and Preventive Services, 8 Am J 
Managed Care 332, 332 (2002) (finding that "[p]hysicians spent 5.6% less time ... with 
patients in capita ted plans that with those in noncapitated plans."). 
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patients and doctors to make efficient decisions tailored to each patient's 
circumstances and preferences.134 
Suppose now that doctors expect to help patients economize. Even such 
doctors face many practical problems in the examining room. For example, 
when should doctors propose thrifty treatments if thrifty means less effective? 
How much should doctors know about patients' financial situations? How 
much should doctors ask? The problems doctors will face become clearer 
when we realize that many patients need help not just with individual medical 
decisions, but with managing their financial situation when medical costs 
pressure their budgets. But a national survey found that "while physicians are 
generally ready to discuss issues of cost with patients, they are less ready to 
discuss medical budgeting .... "135 The problem is not just that cost 
information is hard even for doctors to ascertain; it is also that budgeting 
discussions require doctors to understand something of patients' financial 
situation. But doctors cannot master the insurance programs of all their 
patients, and doctors are misinformed about those programs even in general 
terms. For example, the same national survey found that "many physicians 
may not know that less than half of employers make contributions to their 
employees' medical savings accounts."136 Furthermore, medical budgeting 
raises issues not just of finance, but of the quality of medical care. Yet 
patients may find it difficult to articulate their ideas on this subject, and 
"primary care physicians do not generally trust the quality-of-care 
information that patients in [consumer-directed health plans] may 
increasingly utilize. "137 
This brings us to a problem with informed consent and all other kinds of 
mandated disclosure in medicine - time. Doctors often complain that 
managed care robbed them of time with patients. In fact, doctors apparently 
spend slightly more time with patients than they used to.138 But doctors ftel 
hurried because so much more is asked of them: Medicine can do more 
things, treatments are more complex, chronic diseases requiring elaborate 
care proliferate, and medicine's jurisdiction has broadened as problems are 
medicalized. 
So discussions of cost must jostle for time with other urgent matters. "The 
ever-expanding repertoire of interventions, screening tests, vaccines, and 
devices has dramatically increased the work of patient care for all physician 
specialties." For a general practitioner to provide "all recommended 
preventive services to a panel of 2500 patients could require up to 71/2 hours 
a day of physician time. Generalist physicians repprt that roughly 4 separate 
problems are addressed at each office visit for patients older than 65 years and 
134 Similarly, the designers of Medicare's "diagnostic-related groups" imagined that they 
would cause hospitals to treat more and less profitable services differently. Instead, hospitals 
essentially economized across the board, even for non-Medicare patients. David M. Frankford, 
The Medicare DRGs: Efficiency and Organizational Rationality, 10 Yale J Reg 273, 293-96 
(1993). 
135 Mallya et al, 14 Am J Managed Care at 665 (cited in note 25). 
136 Id at 666. 
137 Id at 665. 
138 David Mechanic and Donna D. McAlpine, "Fifteen Minutes of Fame": Riflections on 
the Uses of Health Research, the Media, Pundits, and the Spin, 20 Health Affairs 211, 213 
(2001). 
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even more issues are addressed for patients with chronic illnesses such as 
diabetes. "139 One study concluded that doctors cannot "deliver all of the 
services recommended by the USPSTF [U.S. Preventive Services Task Force] 
to a representative panel of patients." Nor is reducing the doctor's panel "a 
very practical or realistic solution," since "a 50% reduction in panel size is 
needed to reduce the time requirement to approximately 4 hours a day."140 To 
put the problem differently: "Current practice guidelines for only 10 chronic 
illnesses require more time than primary care physicians have available for 
patient care overall."141 All this threatens consumerism and its dream of 
adding another topic - cost - to already overtaxed discussions. 
Consumerist patients must learn enough about the risks, benefits, and 
costs of tests and treatments to make economical choices. This already 
happens somewhat. But it must happen much more for consumerism to 
flourish, and many obstacles make that unlikely: Patients make few medical 
decisions on their own. Once they consult a physician, they enter a 
relationship which disposes them to follow doctors' orders. Under any kind of 
insurance, patients and doctors are reluctant to discuss costs, doctors know 
too little about costs, and doctors are not driven to economize. Consumerism 
has depreciated these realities, but they menace its prospects. 
V. "CUMBERSOME, COMPLEX, AND DETAILED": CAN 
INFORMATION BE PRESENTED EFFECTIVELY? 
Warum soll es einfach sein, wenn es so leicht kompliziert sein kann?142 
German witticism 
In assessing the prerequisites of consumerism, we have reached several 
conclusions. First, medical markets often offer fewer choices than markets 
need. Second, much information is unavailable and hard to assemble. Third, 
sources of information are often hard to evaluate. Fourth, doctors may be ill-
situated and even undisposed to help patients save money. But suppose, 
arguendo, that information about plans, providers and treatments could 
practically be assembled by trusted and trustworthy sources and that doctors 
want to help patients economize. Can that information be put into a form 
consumers can use to make good decisions? 
A. LITERACY AND NUMERACY 
The first problem in presenting health care choices is that many people 
read and cipher poorly. Most information about health plans, much 
information about providers, and swaths of information about treatments are 
in writing. Yet the "1992 National Adult Literacy Survey ... , the most 
139 Goodson, 298 JAMA at 2308 (cited in note 107). 
140 Kimberly S. H. Yarnall et al, Primary Care: Is There Enough Time for Prevention?, 
93 Am J Public Health 635, 637 (2003). 
141 Truls Ostbye et al, Is There Time for Management of Patients With Chronic Diseases 
in Primary Care?, 3 Ann Fam Med. 209, 209 (2005). 
142 
"Why should it be simple, when it can so easily be complicated?" 
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accurate portrait of English language literacy in the United States, found that 
40 to 44 million Americans, or approximately one quarter of the US 
population, are functionally illiterate, and another 50 million have marginal 
literacy skills."143 Illiteracy matters in health care: A "third of English-
speaking patients at 2 public hospitals could not read and understand basic 
health-related materials," and 42% of the patients studied could not 
"comprehend directions for taking medication on an empty stomach, 26% 
could not understand information on an appointment slip, and 60% could not 
understand a standard consent form." Patients' incomprehension of 
"information about disease management, prevention, and informed consent 
... [means that] physicians are not successful in communicating essential 
health care information to their patients, particularly to those with inadequate 
health literacy."~44 Furthermore, many literate people cannot manage 
complicated material. For example, to reach the 80th percentile in literacy 
you need only comprehend a (straightforward) definition of "peremptory 
challenge" given jury pools. 
Consumers are also hobbled by innumeracy:145 "Numeracy, or the ability 
to process basic probability and numerical concepts,"146 influences 
"comprehension of important health information."147 Numeracy "is related to 
health literacy, but makes an independent contribution to comprehension and 
choices" and can even be "a stronger predictor of these outcomes than health 
literacy."148 
Numeracy is increasingly important because patients "are increasingly 
being exposed to quantitative information about risks for disease and benefits 
of treatment." Yet "many persons do not work well with numbers."149 For 
example, people were asked to: (1) guess how often a flipped coin would come 
up heads in 1,000 tries, (2) asked to calculate 1% of 1,000, and (3) turn a 
proportion (1 in 1000) into a percentage. "Thirty percent of respondents had 
0 correct answers, 28% had 1 correct answer, 26% had 2 correct answers, and 
16% had 3 correct answers." This innumeracy hobbled women given 
"quantitative risk reduction data" about mammography. Few of them could 
"apply quantitative information about the benefit of mammography to their 
perceived risk for death from breast cancer."150 
Similarly, innumeracy confounds consumers making many kinds of 
purchases. For example, picking and using credit cards are simpler than 
understanding and buying health care. Yet "[ w ]hen thousands of adults from 
across the country were given tests of basic math and basic literacy, a 
143 Ad Hoc Committee on Health Literacy for the Council on Scientific Affairs, 
American Medical Association, Health Literacy: Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs, 281 
JAMA 552, 552 (1999). 
t44 Id. 
145 On the word and the problem, see John Allen Paulos, Innumeracy: Mathematical 
Illiteracy and Its Consequences (Hill and Wang, 2001). 
146 Judith H. Hibbard et a!, Consumer Competencies and the Use of Comparative 
Quality Information: It Isn't Just About Literacy, 64 Med Care Res & Rev 379, 388 (2007). 
147 Id at 380. 
148 Id at 388. 
149 Lisa M. Schwartz et a!, The Role of Numeracy in Understanding the Benefit of 
Screening Mammography, 127 Ann Intern Med 966, 966 (1997). 
15o Id. 
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significant portion of the population was unable to make the comparisons 
necessary to assess the cost of credit card debt."151 
It is thus inevitable that one study "found that comprehending key 
differences between a CDHP and a conventional PPO was challenging for 
consumers, particularly those with lower numeracy." They understood "less 
about the CDHP and reported having more difficulty understanding plan 
differences than those higher in numeracy; yet they were substantially more 
likely to select the CDHP." The study's authors suggest that "once enrolled, 
less numerate enrollees also may have more difficulty making the type of cost-
effective decisions that CDHPs were developed to foster."152 
In sum, anyone presenting information to consumers climbs a high 
barrier - many people read badly and cipher worse. Yet much health care 
information must be presented in writing and numbers, and much of it is 
inherently complex, dense, and obscure. 
B. PRESENTATION 
Now assume away literacy and numeracy problems. How well can 
information be presented? We begin by asking what consumers need to know 
about health plans. Consumers say they want to know about: 
(1) access (to chosen doctor, to specialists, length of time to get an 
appointment, ability to get care when needed, telephone access); 
(2) amount of paperwork; (3) benefits; (4) choice ofprovider (of 
doctors, of hospitals, ability to keep one's own doctor); 
(5) communication/interpersonal skills/caring of provider; 
(6) convenience (of choosing doctor, getting care, location); 
(7) coordination of care; (8) costs; (9) courtesy and manner of 
physicians and staff; (10) hospital ratings; (11) good value for the 
money; (12) plan administrative hassles; and (13) quality (of care 
overall, of particular types of care, of providers).153 
Well, sure. Each item is reasonable, but the list is wickedly long and could 
easily be expanded. And most of the items comprise multiple elements. For 
example, "access" includes the "ability to get care when needed." This in turn 
subsumes things like how the plan decides when a treatment is covered (an 
issue that provoked bitterness about and lawsuits over managed care). That 
issue, again in turn, is a fountain of questions about who decides what 
treatment is excluded on what grounds and how patients challenge 
exclusions.154 
All these things could - perhaps should - influence consumers' choices. 
But consumers cannot mean what they say. They often ignore even simple 
disclosures. For example, Blue Cross of California posted plan enrollees' 
ratings of hospitals' costs. It used the Zagat method, "where '$' is assigned to 
151 Block-Lieb and Janger, 84 Texas L Rev at 1538 (cited in note 75). 
152 Jessica Greene et al, 14 Am J Managed Care at 374 (cited in note 26). 
153 Lubalin and Harris-Kojetin, 56 Med Care Res & Rev at 72 (cited in note 77). 
154 Worse, people's view of the information they need for choosing a health care plan or 
treatment changes rapidly as they acquire information. 
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the lowest-cost hospitals and'$$$$' to the highest." Great idea. But "the plan 
discontinued this feature" for lack ofuse.155 
Wanting much but using little is normal. For example, patients 
fabulously over-estimate how much information they want in choosing 
treatments. In one large study, "[m]ost subjects (76.2%) responded that they 
would want to hear of any adverse effects [of a treatment], no matter how 
rare." And 83% wanted to know about any "serious adverse effect, no matter 
how rare."156 Do people really want WebMD's whole list of one drug's side 
effects: excess stomach acid secretion, irritation of the stomach or intestines, 
nausea, vomiting, heartburn, stomach cramps, bronchospasm, stomach ulcers, 
intestinal ulcers, hepatitis, stomach or intestinal bleeding, inflammation of 
skin, redness of skin, itching, hives, rash, wheezing, trouble breathing, life-
threatening allergic reaction, giant hives, rupture in the wall of the stomach or 
intestines, hemolytic anemia, large skin blotches, decreased blood platelets, 
decreased white blood cells, and decreased appetite? Will people still want 
the list when they learn that this alarming drug is Aspirin? 
But suppose we winnow out the information that most helps consumers. 
How do we present it? Many have tried. Many have failed. For instance, 
California posted a sample charge master. But, Reinhardt concludes, 
"prospective patients would be hard put to make sense of these price lists."157 
For another instance, "the Minnesota Health Data Institute distributed a 16-
page, statewide report card that featured comparison tables and color-coded 
graphs of consumer satisfaction within categories of health plans and 
compared 38 plans based on 20 performance measures." However, "less than 
half of those seeing the report thought it was helpful for deciding on a plan. 
Consumers found the report cards cumbersome, complex, and detailed."158 
So why are report cards "cumbersome, complex, and detailed"? Why not 
just make them handy, straightforward, and simple? We again consult 
experience in related areas. Institutional review boards must approve all 
"human-subject" research, and they notoriously make informed consent their 
summum, perhaps solum, bonum. Commissions and commentators, 
researchers and institutional review boards, have long demanded handy, 
straightforward, and simple consent forms. Nevertheless, IRBs persistently 
insist on adding information to forms, and they can be tens of (repellent) 
pages long. 
Why don't IRBs practice what they preach? Partly because in a given case 
no one can deny that one more datum might be crucial to someone's decision. 
As we saw, if you ask patients how much they want to know, they say 
"everything." If patients think they "want to hear of any serious adverse effect, 
no matter how rare,"159 the slippery slope to interminable disclosure is slick.160 
155 Ginsburg, 26 Health Affairs at w213 (cited in noted 55). This disclosure was also 
abandoned because it created "pressure for price increases from hospitals identified as low 
cost." Id. 
156 Dewey K. Ziegler et al, How Much Information About Adverse Effects of Medication 
Do Patients Want from Physicians?, 161 Arch Intern Med 706, 708 (2001) (emphasis added). 
157 Reinhardt, 25 Health Affairs at 59 (cited in note 39). 
158 Judith H. Hibbard et a!, Iriforming Consumer Decisions in Health Care: 
Implications from Decision-Making Research, 75 Milbank Q 395, 398 (1997). 
159 Ziegler eta!, 161 Arch Intern Med at 708 (cited in note 156) (emphasis added). 
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And bad as the information problem has been when IRBs review research, the 
problem is worse when consumers choose plans and providers because much 
more information can be relevant. Research subjects are told the risks of one 
experiment; health care consumers may need any kind of treatment for any 
kind of ailment. 
So with health care information, less is not more. But perversely, more is 
too much. First, who reads long forms?161 Second, the longer the form, the 
harder it is to understand. A "large body of empirical work suggest[s] that the 
integration of different types of information and values into a decision is a 
very difficult cognitive process." For example, "people can process and use 
only a limited number of variables." In one nifty study, Slavic asked expert 
handicappers to predict horse races using "from 5, 10, 20, and, later 40 
variables." The more information the experts had, the more confident they 
were. "However, predictive ability was as good with 5 variables as with 10, 20, 
or 40." Worse, "reliability of the choices decreased as more information was 
made available. That is, when individuals had more information, their ability 
to use it 'consistently' declined.m62 
Not only does adding information not reliably improve and may impair 
understanding, it can reduce the amount of information people use. "An 
increase in the number of alternatives (three, six, and nine) being considered 
in this research has been shown also to increase the number of participants 
(21 percent, 31 percent, and 77 percent, respectively) who rely on elimination 
strategies ... leading to a reduction in the amount of information used.m63 
The hopeless choice between less and more information pervades health 
care decisions. Plans are irreducibly complex - they either cover or exclude 
every human ailment. They allocate unpredictable costs among many players 
in elaborate ways. They are confusingly structured and mysteriously 
administered.164 
Even a single aspect of a single plan can be too complex to be explained to 
people of ordinary patience. For example, a notoriously upsetting feature of 
managed care is capitation - paying providers a fixed sum per year per 
patient. This creates an incentive to under-treat patients. Explaining why 
this may be sensible is an uphill battle, but that's just the beginning, because 
"capitation" is exhaustingly complicated. Its effects are "mediated by such 
variables as size of the patient panel, amount of the capitation sum, 
refinement of risk adjustments, dollar value of stop-loss provisions, and scope 
of risk (does it extend, for example, to specialist referrals and drugs?), not to 
mention such relative intangibles as the force of professional ethics and fear of 
160 On the travails of IRBs with informed consent, see Simon Whitney and Carl E. 
Schneider, The Stop of Truth: The Case Against the IRB System (forthcoming). 
161 Apparently this is an old problem. "According to the statutes of the university, every 
student before he is matriculated must subscribe his assent to the Thirty-nine Articles of the 
Church of England, which are signed by more than read them, and read by more than believe 
them." Edward Gibbon, The Autobiography of Edward Gibbon 82 (Meridian Books, 1961). 
162 Hibbard et al, 75 Milbank Qat 397-98 (cited in note 158) (emphasis added). 
163 Hanoch and Rice, 84 Milbank Qat 41 (cited in 82). 
164 The complexity to which health-insurance can descend is exemplified by Medicaid, a 
"horribly complicated law" that is "almost unintelligible to the uninitiated." So unintelligible 
that "millions of eligible people are not enrolled." Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient: In 
Search ofNon-Debt-BasedAlternatives, 69 Brooklyn L Rev 453, 467-68 (2004). 
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malpractice suits." So there "is no obvious informational middle ground 
between demonizing capitation and turning consumers into incipient health 
service researchers. "165 
One of us (Hall) tried to solve this problem with "extensive efforts at 
disclosure." Even then, disclosing incentives had "limited or no impact on 
patient trust of physicians and health plans." No wonder plan representatives 
said that disclosures ''have been a 'big yawn,' 'useless,' and have not caused 
'even a ripple' of a reaction. One large plan which, like others, invites 
members to call if they have questions or want additional information, 
received only two inquiries in the first two years."166 
Complexity has another aspect. Consumers need baselines. You can rate 
the Ritz because you've stayed at the Marriott and the Hotel Misere. But 
people know little and misunderstand much about health care and health care 
financing. Professor Sage is mild - "the American public is poorly informed 
about modern health care financing and delivery. "167 People misperceive even 
their own coverage. "Previous research has indicated that consumers do not 
understand many of the key concepts of managed care; our study results 
indicate that this lack of understanding also applies to their own health 
plan."168 Although plan members' "accuracy of reporting on some individual 
attributes was fairly high, fewer than one-third of respondents (30.3 percent) 
correctly reported all four attributes .... [J]ust over half of respondents (56 
percent) accurately reported both network attributes, while just under half 
( 48.8 percent) accurately reported both gatekeeper attributes."169 
This is not reprehensible; people have better things to do than become 
health care experts. Nevertheless, consumers lack ''baseline information that 
could provide context for required disclosure,'' and they therefore "can easily 
misinterpret even accurate data. In one example, potential enrollees regarded 
report card data showing high hospitalization rates of health plan enrollees 
for pneumonia as showing leniency in approving inpatient treatment rather 
than demonstrating failure to administer vaccinations."170 
165 Brown, 56 Med Care Res & Rev at 161 (cited in note 68) (footnotes omitted). "We 
can tell people whether we have a withhold, bonus payments or capitation,' remarked Paul 
Langevin, president of the New Jersey HMO Association, 'but there are literally over 100,000 
ways to pay, and these systems are very proprietary. And, quite frankly, the plans change them 
all the time.'" I d. 
166 Mark A. Hall, The Theory and Practice of Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives, 65 L 
& Contemp Prob 207, 229 (2002). "Similarly, under the Medicare rules, regulators and plans 
reported that beneficiaries who are told that they have the right to request information about 
physician incentives rarely or never do so." I d. 
167 William M. Sage, Accountability Through Iriformation: lVhat the Health Care 
Industry Can Learn from Securities Regulation 22 (Milbank Memorial Fund, 2000). 
168 Peter J. Cunningham eta!, Do Consumers Know How Their Health Plan Works?, 20 
Health Affairs 159, 165 (2001). 
169 Id at 163. Another example: "approximately one-third of patients correctly 
identified their physicians' payment method, one-third were incorrect, and one-third did not 
know." Tracy E. Miller and Carol R. Horowitz, Disclosing Doctors' Incentives: Will Consumers 
Understand and Value the Information?, 19 Health Affairs 149, 150 (2000) (describing Audrey 
C. Kao et al, The Relationship Between Method of Physician Payment and Patient Trust, 280 
JAMA 1708 (1998)). Another study agreed that most patients know "little about how their 
health plan" compensates doctors. Anne G. Pereira and Steven D. Pearson, Patient Attitudes 
Toward Physician Financial Incentives, 161 Arch Intern Med 1313, 1316 (2001). 
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In sum, consumers must learn forbiddingly much and make forbiddingly 
hard comparisons. This is why comprehensible report cards are so necessary, 
and so hard to write. We again consult similar problems in related areas. The 
"readability" of many kinds of mandated disclosures has been much studied, 
and the news is bad: It is almost impossible to put complicated information in 
written language that most people can understand. For example, two-thirds 
of the privacy disclosure forms academic medical centers used "were written 
beyond the 12th grade reading level, and almost the entire sample (90%) fell 
in the difficult range of reading ease."l71 A similar study of hospitals found the 
forms ''beyond the reading capacity of the majority of American adults."172 
Even the model forms IRBs distribute are often well below IRBs' own 
"readability standards."173 
So, you say, if report cards are unreadable, make them readable. If 
language is complex, simplifY it. If text is dense, prune it. If pages are dull, 
brighten them. But people have been trying to do exactly this for decades. 
Attempts to improve the information consumers receive about health 
insurance, like attempts to improve informed consent, have had some success, 
but not enough success to equip patients and consumers to make good 
decisions. For example, there were only "modest gains in Medicare-related 
knowledge" in both "a local and a national study."174 In short, nothing in the 
experience of mandated disclosure in other areas suggests that information 
about health plans can be presented to consumers in a way that will bring 
them up to consumerist standards. And nothing in the experience of telling 
consumers about health plans or patients about treatments suggests 
otherwise.175 
We have asked whether consumers will learn enough about their choices 
to select plans, providers, and treatments shrewdly enough to buy the best 
coverage, choose the best doctors and hospitals, select the thriftiest 
treatments, and thus help control health care costs. We have charted a long 
list of reasons consumers cannot find or understand the information they 
need. No doubt some progress can be made in some places in some ways. But 
strenuous efforts both in health care and in analogous areas have barely 
budged the meter, and we should not expect much better in any foreseeable 
future. 
171 S. Walfish and K.M. Watkins, Readability Level of Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act Notices of Privacy Practices Utilized by Academic Medical Centers, 28 Eval 
Health Prof 479, 479 (2005). 
172 M.K. Paasche-Orlow et al, Notices of Privacy Practices: A Survey of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Documents Presented to Patients at US 
Hospitals, 43 Med Care 558, 558 (2005). 
173 M.K. Paasche-Orlow et al, Readability Standards for Informed-Consent Forms as 
Compared with Actual Readability, 20 NEJM 348, 348 (2003). 
174 Lauren A. McCormack et al, Measuring Beneficiary Knowledge in Two Randomized 
Experiments, 23 Health Care Financing Rev 47, 60 (2001). 
175 On some of the barriers to success, see Michele Heisler, Helping Your Patients With 
Chronic Disease: Effective Physician Approaches to Support Self-Management, 8 Seminars 
Med Prac 43, 49 (2005); Kimberley Koons Woloshin et al, Patients' Interpretation of 
Qualitative Probability Statements, 3 Arch Fam Med 961, 965 (1994). 
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C. DEUS EX MACHINA: EDUCATION 
Consumerists defend consumerism by invoking the same "Great Solution" 
that will rescue us from so many other problems - education. If only patients 
can be taught more facts and more skills. As Kapp says, the champions of 
informed consent place "much faith ... in ... patients to comprehend and 
manage adequately the basic information needed to satisfY informed consent 
aspirations." These tools include "more sophisticated decision aids in the 
form of information technology; the provision of written handouts to patients; 
presentation of information in qualitative, quantitative, and graphic formats, 
simplified to reach the lower literate patient; and the showing of 
videotapes. "176 
This is the triumph of hope over experience. Educating consumers to 
thrifty and intelligent choices has been part of the health care ethos for years. 
Yet the results are dispiriting. For example, a decade ago Medicare 
beneficiaries chose between a fee-for-service plan and managed care plans. 
When asked about their choice, "few" beneficiaries were well informed. Even 
those who used "multiple information sources ... often ... [had] less-than-
adequate knowledge."177 Thirty percent knew almost nothing about HMOs. 
Thirty-one percent of HMO respondents and 30 percent of traditional 
Medicare respondents "failed to pass the screening questions and could not go 
on to take the knowledge test. "178 Of those who passed the screening test, 
"only 16 percent had adequate knowledge ... to choose between traditional 
Medicare and an HMO. More than 41 percent scored in the 'inadequate' 
range ... [, and] 7 percent scored in the lowest quartile (equal to or worse 
than guessing). "179 In short, these consumers knew far too little to make good 
choices. As Cunningham puts it, "A considerable body of evidence indicates 
that early efforts to educate consumers have not been very effective .... m80 
What, though, of the tools Kapp lists? With skill and struggle, they can 
produce statistically significant improvements in understanding. But they 
have not brought and will not bring patients to adequate understanding. Take 
one vital consideration for consumers. Lubalin writes, "With appropriate 
education, over time consumers may begin to understand the role that plan 
structure plays relative to doctor performance in affecting their care and plan 
experiences."181 But researchers have long striven to create that "appropriate 
education" - with dismal results. And see how cautious Lubalin is. This 
education will take time. All this education over time "may" teach consumers 
something, but that "something" is only "beginning" to understand the 
subject. 
Consumers remain poorly informed, even about their own plans, even 
after extraordinary efforts to educate them. One study, for example, "surveyed 
adults a year after they were enrolled in a New York State pilot project aimed 
176 Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care: 
Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 28 J Legal Med 91, 102 (2007). 
177 Judith H. Hibbard et al, Can Medicare Beneficiaries Make Informed Choices?, 17 
Health Affairs 181, 190-91 (1998). 
178 Id at 185. 
179 Id at 186. 
'
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181 Lubalin and Harris-Kojetin, 56 Med Care Res & Rev at 73 (cited in note 77). 
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at expanding health care coverage for the uninsured." The five plans "made 
extensive efforts to educate enrollees about the plans,"182 including "individual 
in-person enrollment meetings, during which staff describe eligibility and 
benefits; brochures or videotapes; detailed enrollment contracts; question-
and-answer documents in Spanish and English; and, at one plan, a required 
educational seminar."183 Nevertheless, "fewer than a third of enrollees could 
answer all three questions correctly; for four of the five plans, fewer than one-
fifth could answer all three questions correctly." Discouragingly, for example, 
"as few as 29.2 percent of respondents in Brooklyn understood that their plan 
covered out-of-area emergency care despite explicit wording in the Health 
Insurance Plan of Greater New York (HIP) handbook," and except "in 
Manhattan, fewer than 42 percent of respondents knew that their plan limited 
their choice of hospitals."184 
Nor do the lessons of related areas make education a convincing Great 
Solution. Informed consent may be the closest comparison, and decades of 
striving show that while skillfully created and energetically administered 
education can nudge up understanding, it regularly fails to prepare patients to 
make truly informed choices about complex issues. Nor has education worked 
wonderfully better in other areas in which consumers labor. For example, 
"investment education does not significantly change investment behavior 
among 40I(k) plan participants."185 
Another crucial point is regularly overlooked. Education is the Great 
Solution not just to this problem, but to many problems. People are daily 
admonished to become better consumers and be more responsible for more 
decisions in more areas. An ever-more complex world generates ever-more 
things to learn. Choices about even standard products proliferate.186 Who, for 
example, can really buy a telephone? Corded? Wireless? Cellular? Internet? 
Which phone company, or cell phone company, or Internet company? Which 
manufacturer? Which bells? Which whistles? A camera? Internet? What's 
cheapest? Most useful? Best? And what other questions are we too elderly to 
know about? 
Consumers must do more than buy goods and services intelligently. For 
example, defined-contribution pensions oblige us to manage retirement 
accounts (and "privatizing" Social Security would exacerbate things nicely). 
Other financial issues proliferate, like handling debt.187 And think of all the 
(often changing) lessons about health and safety everyone should learn. No 
182 Deborah W. Garnick et al, How Well Do Americans Understand Their Health 
Coverage?, 12 Health Affairs 204, 206 (1993). 
183 Id at 207. 
184 Id at 209. 
185 Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the Four "Truths" of Personal Social Security 
Accounts: Evidence From the World of 401(K) Plans, 81 NC L Rev 901, 947-48 (2003). On the 
scant knowledge about Social Security benefits, see Ruth Helman et al, Encouraging Workers 
to Save: The 2005 Retirement Confidence Survey, 280 EBRI Issue Brief 1, 27 (2005). 
186 One literature suggests that people are happier and choose better when options are 
not too numerous. See e.g., Sheena S. Iyengar and Mark R. Lepper, When Choice is 
Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J Personality & Social Psych 
995 (2000). 
187 These things are complicated enough that high schools now teach courses covering 
them. Alas, with dismal success. See Block-Lieb and Janger, 84 Texas L Rev at 1561 (cited in 
note 75). 
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wonder it has taken so many decades of so much effort to bring home the 
information that has gradually convinced many people not to smoke. 
We are no enemies of education. Gladly would we learn, and gladly teach. 
But fifty professorial years have taught us that both teaching and learning are 
humblingly difficult. This is a lesson consumerists seem not to have learned. 
VI. ANAL¥ZING INFORMATION 
The human understanding is not a dry light, but is infused by desire 
and emotion, which give rise to 'wishful science'. For man prifers to 
believe what he wants to be true. He therifore rejects difficulties, being 
impatient of inquiry; sober things, because they restrict his hope; 
deeper parts of Nature, because of his superstition; the light of 
experience, because of his arrogance and pride, lest his mind should 
seem to concern itself with things mean and transitory; things that are 
strange and contrary to all expectation, because of common opinion. 
Francis Bacon 
Novum Organum 
Again suppose away all the problems we've traversed. Imagine we have 
adequate choices. We have reliable information. We have selected the right 
information to present. We have decided how to present it. Doctors have 
cooperated. We have presented it. Consumers have received it. Consumers 
have understood it. We have at last reached the goal- consumers situated to 
choose health plans, providers, and treatments intelligently. How willingly 
and well will consumers do so? 
On the whole, people reason less willingly and well than sound 
consumerist decisions require. This may conflict with ordinary intuitions. It 
certainly conflicts with consumerism's assumptions. But those intuitions and 
assumptions rest on misconceptions about human nature. In this section we 
criticize those misconceptions. Then we present evidence that people make 
unfamiliar decisions generally, and medical decisions particularly, less 
adroitly than consumerism requires. 
A. HOMO ARBITER 
Consumerism misconceives human nature. Understandably. Its 
misconceptions fit conventional intuitions about how people make decisions. 
Its misconceptions are shared by the field that treats the ethical problems of 
health care - bioethics. And its misconceptions underlie the law of mandated 
disclosure. Consumerism, bioethics, and much law rest on a plausible 
assumption and plausible inferences from the assumption about human 
nature. Both the assumption and the reasoning from it are partly correct. 
Nevertheless, they both fail in ways that mislead policy-makers and rule-
writers. 
The plausible assumption is that people demand "control." The plausible 
inferences are that therefore people: (1) want to make all the decisions that 
could affect their lives, and (2) make those decisions skillfully. In other 
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words, consumerism, bioethics, and much law expect a world populated by 
homo arbiter, by people whose raison d'etre is making decisions. Homo 
arbiter cherishes decisions, reaches out to make decisions, relishes decisions. 
There is obviously crucial truth in the assumption, the inferences, and even 
this view of human nature. But the truth is only partial and leaves out much 
in human nature that is necessary for establishing workable policies. 
First, the assumption. "Control" matters. But most people don't want 
control of everything, at least if that means mastering difficult subjects to 
reach difficult conclusions. Control may be comforting, and impotence is 
misery. But people routinely acquiesce in decisions with relatively little 
information about them. 
Next, the inferences. The first inference is that wanting control means 
wanting to tackle every decision in sight. But, ironically, seeking plenary 
control is inimical to enjoying the things that really matter to you. Complete 
control means making choices, and making choices well enough to achieve 
"control" is soul-sucking and time-absorbing. You can't exercise- plenary 
control and still devote yourself to, as Freud put it, "work and love." 
Furthermore, who likes decisions? The drudgery of learning, the agonies of 
indecision, the risks of responsibility - these are charms cheerfully foregone.188 
The second inference is that people make decisions capably. Making good 
decisions is harshly harder than it looks. The process is less rational and less 
under our control than we think. Our decisions are driven by intuitions that 
are almost invisible to us. And "an enormous body of psychological evidence 
tells us that a person (such as you or I) has no reliable insight into the roots of 
his own intuition."189 In fact, what seems like making a decision is often 
finding a rationale for a choice we have made unknowingly. 
When we say people are less avid to make decisions and make them less 
well than consumerism hopes, we are easily misunderstood. Our meaning will 
become apparent as we show how consumers actually analyze purchases of 
health plans, providers, and treatments. However, two clarifications may 
avert misunderstandings. First, while people are reluctant to take on all kinds 
of dicey decisions, they certainly care what happens to themselves. Some 
choices almost everyone wants to make personally (marriage, for example), 
and some choices we make by individual preference. But people resist making 
many critical decisions, and often for excellent reasons. 
Second, we are not saying that people rarely make good decisions. People 
manage their lives just fine because most decisions concern familiar subjects. 
When you make the same decision repeatedly you learn what your options are, 
see choices work out or fail, and practice making decisions more shrewdly. 
You build up reliable intuitions. Experience is a great teacher. But you lose 
all these advantages when you make unfamiliar decisions. And choosing 
health plans, providers, and medical treatments swamps you in the 
unfamiliar. 
188 Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less (HarperCollins, 2004), 
develops many of these points. 
189 Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk: Why the Public and the Experts Disagree on 
Environmental Issues 33 (U Chicago Press, 1996). 
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B. LET THIS CUP ... 
If people refuse to ponder a choice, nobody can make them. And if people 
are reluctant to make a fully pondered choice, they won't collect and analyze 
information adequately. But unstudied and unanalyzed choices can be 
disastrous. Medical information is often elusive, obscure, unfamiliar, messy, 
and uncertain. If consumers do not energetically master this confusion, they 
cannot make well-founded purchases. They will not ferret out information, 
read it, grapple with it, survey alternatives, probe preferences, or bring 
themselves to a conclusion. Consumerism demands willing consumers. 
Consumerism will only find them sporadically. In area after area of life, 
people say and show that they are less thirsty to choose than consumerists 
expect. Some of the richest evidence of this reluctance is in studies of a 
decision patients must make- the choice about medical treatments. We study 
this example in detail because if people don't seize treatment decisions, they 
are unlikely to seize other medical decisions. 
The evidence that patients do not long to make medical decisions is 
compelling. One study can stand for many.190 Ende and his colleagues 
concluded that "patients' preferences for decision making in general were 
weak." Where 0 meant no desire to make decisions and 100 meant an intense 
desire to do so, the mean score was 33. Worse, "as patients were asked to 
consider increasingly severe illnesses, their desires to make decisions 
themselves declined. "191 
The example of medical decisions suggests why people yearn less for 
"control" than consumerists imagine. Patients have excellent reasons for 
accepting guidance, especially from experts. Illness corrodes the crafts and 
arts needed to learn novel and knotty things. Patients are exhausted, rattled, 
discouraged, harried, and hurried. They are absorbed by the problems of 
getting through the day that illness exacerbates and by the large questions 
about life that illness thrusts before them. Rarely can they spare time and 
attention to collect information thoroughly, assimilate it properly, and analyze 
it soundly. Rather, they turn with relief to people with expertise and 
experience for guidance. 
People who avoid medical decisions should a fortiori resist choosing 
health plans. That choice turns on scaling mountains of daunting data. It 
requires anticipating unpredictable needs too dreadful to imagine. Medical 
decisions generally can be made with less information and more help than 
decisions about health plans. So who wants to choose a plan? We ourselves 
do not, and we have met only one person who might (maybe). And as all 
teachers know, unwilling learners are poor learners. 
There is yet more evidence that people approach health care purchases 
diffidently. Decades ago, before widespread health insurance, patients had 
every reason to buy care carefully. Nevertheless, 
190 This reluctance to make medical decisions is discussed and defended in Schneider, 
The Practice of Autonomy (cited in note 20). Chapter 2 scrutinizes the empirical data with 
tiresome thoroughness. 
191 Jack En de et al, Measuring Patient's Desire for Autonomy: Decision Making and 
Information-Seeking Preferences Among Medical Patients, 4 J Gen Intern Med 23, 26-27 
(1989). 
48 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF lAW & MEDICINE VOL. 35 NO.1 2009 
few patients either knew or tried to discover whether their health 
care could be purchased at different prices; prices were never 
published or advertised. Patients generally had faith in their 
physicians and assumed the fees were fair and valid - whether or 
not they could afford to pay them. They obediently entered 
whatever hospital they were sent to and took their prescriptions 
to the pharmacy or provider that the physician suggested. 
Experience indicates that few patients, even those who 
complained about the costs, did any shopping around for better 
prices.192 
If consumers thought consumerism wonderfully advantageous, they might 
overcome their aversion to intimidating decisions. But "individuals with 
comprehensive health insurance were significantly more satisfied with their 
health plan than individuals" with consumer plans. They were "more likely 
than those with a [consumer plan] to report that they were extremely or very 
likely to recommend their health plan to a friend or coworker." And people in 
consumer plans were "less likely than those with more comprehensive health 
insurance to report that they were likely to stay with their current plan if they 
had the opportunity to change plans."193 
Furthermore, consumerist decisions almost invite evasion because they 
are both distressing and avoidable. Consumerism forces patients to (1) choose 
and (2) economize. But choosing is labor, and economizing is sacrifice. In 
addition, consumerism must convince people that health care costs them 
money. Making the flight of money out the door visible is not exhibiting 
something pleasant. Not only is assessing health care choices distasteful; it is 
delightfully easy to neglect. If you are working with a doctor, follow the 
doctor's advice. If you are choosing a health plan, select one or two plan 
attributes and rest your decision on them. Or just follow your colleagues' lead. 
Check a box. File and forget. 
We said earlier that if people don't want to make decisions, they won't 
make them well. There is direct evidence that in making medical choices 
people do not do the things they themselves say they need to do. People 
acknowledge that information is crucial: even the same studies that say 
patients are reluctant to make medical decisions say that patients want 
information. For example, in the Ende study, "the mean score for information 
seeking was [on the 0-to-100 scale] 79.5 fflll.5."194 
But while consumers insist that they want loads of information, they 
shrug most of it off. For example, only about half of the people in consumerist 
plans "indicated that they had made use of the information about quality and 
cost of their doctors" and "had tried to use information on the quality of 
hospitals."195 For another example, a national study of Medicare beneficiaries 
192 Benson B. Roe, The UCR Boondoggle: A Death Knell for Private Practice?, 305 NEJM 
41, 43 (1981). And twenty years ago Judith H. Hibbard and Edward C. Weeks, Consumerism 
in Health Care: Prevalence and Predictors, 25 Med Care 1019 (1987), questioned whether 
patients would be willing to be consumers. 
193 Fronstin and Collins, 315 EBRI Issue Brief at 15 (cited in note 23). 
194 Ende et al, 4 J Gen Intern Med at 26 (cited in note 191). This remarkable contrast 
between an information score of 80 and a participation score of 33 is typical. 
195 Fronstin and Collins, 315 EBRI Issue Brief at 29 (cited in note 23). 
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who had undergone high-risk surgery (abdominal-aneurysm repair, heart-
valve replacement, or resection of the bladder, lung or stomach for cancer) 
reported that only "10% of respondents seriously considered going elsewhere 
for surgery. Few respondents (11%) looked for information to compare 
hospitals. Almost all respondents thought their hospital and surgeon had 
good reputations (94% and 88%, respectively) .... "196 
The theory of consumerism is that people will shop for the best 
combination of cost and quality. But the evidence suggests that quality tends 
to get ignored in decisions. "Literature suggests that patients do not engage in 
rational or 'consumerist' behavior when searching for or choosing physicians. 
They instead rely heavily on recommendations from family and friends and 
engage in limited searches for alternative physicians .... "197 The Harris study 
"confirm[ed] the image depicted in the previous literature of patients as 
passive consumers of physician services" and concluded "that, in the current 
market, physicians do not have to compete to maintain the loyalty of 
established patients."198 Similarly, a recent study found that "[f]ew of the 
consumers who needed new providers reported using either price or quality 
information in choosing those providers .... "~99 
One reason that people underuse quality information is (as we said 
earlier) that people do not realize how wide the range of quality can be. 
Another is that people are not competent to evaluate quality and thus base 
choices on things they can evaluate. Thus when focus groups were asked what 
they looked for in a doctor, the "majority of responses focused on the 
interpersonal aspects of care - communication, respect, and caring." Those 
aspects of care are surely crucial. But people do not seem to have made a 
considered decision that those aspects are the only crucial ones: when "a 
cogent framework was used to present quality information," the group 
members "changed their minds about what was important in selecting health 
plans and providers and indicated a desire to use indicators of evidence-based 
care when making health care choices."200 
We have presented evidence that people make medical choices less 
willingly than consumerism assumes and needs. That evidence is confirmed 
by evidence that people avoid other consequential decisions. For example, in 
financial planning, "passive decision-making" is the norm. "[M]any 
households appear to passively accept the status quo."201 Thus, companies 
that used different default choices for employee contributions to retirement 
plans found employees simply sticking with whatever position they had been 
assigned. 
196 Lisa M. Schwartz et a!, How Do Elderly Patients Decide Where to Go for Major 
Surgery?, 331 BMJ 821, 821 (2005). 
197 Katherine M. Harris, How Do Patients Choose Physicians? Evidence from a National 
Survey of Enrollees in Employment-Related Health Plans, 38 Health Services Res 711, 712 
(2003). 
198 Id at 729. 
199 HaT. Tu and Johanna R. Lauer, Word of Mouth and Physician Riferrals Still Drive 
Health Care Provider Choice, 9 Center Studying Health System Change 1, 5 (2008). 
200 Judith Hibbard and L. Gregory Pawlson, Why Not Give Consumers a Framework for 
Understanding Quality?, 30 Joint Commission Journal Quality & Safety 347, 349 (2004). 
201 James J. Choi et a!, Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Choices, 
and the Path of Least Resistance, prepared for Taa: Policy and the Economy 32 (2001). 
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Retirement planning provides a close and fruitful comparison to buying 
health- care plans. The former is relatively easy, since most people are too 
poor to have elaborate investment choices and need only a few simple 
principles - like "diversify!" - that are ceaselessly repeated everywhere. 
Nevertheless, many people have not even tried to plan for their retirement. 
"Only 42 percent of workers report they and/or their spouse have tried to 
calculate how much money they will need to have saved by the time they retire 
so· that they can live comfortably in retirement."202 Gloriously unrealistic 
expectations about retirement abound. For example, "[t]wo-thirds of workers 
say they expect to work for pay after they retire ( 66 percent) .... However, just 
one-quarter of retirees report having actually worked for pay at some time 
during their retirement .... "203 
Furthermore, many people misunderstand the most basic facts and 
principles of retirement investing. A "1995 survey by John Hancock Financial 
Services found that a majority of respondents thought money market funds 
were riskier than government bonds, and felt that their own company stock 
was safer than a diversified portfolio."204 People often invest in notoriously 
perilous ways. For example, people who can buy company stock for 
retirement accounts allocate "nearly 42 percent of the assets [to it], more than 
any other type of investment,"205 thus dangerously flouting the "diversify!" 
principle (think Enron). Nevertheless, "investors often do not recognize how 
difficult these choices are and instead rely on a belief that their innate abilities 
will lead to a good investment result."206 (Human self-confidence is 
marvelous to behold.) 
In sum, consumerism needs willing consumers, but many people are 
generally unengaged consumers who resist making decisions in the full-
throated way consumerism assumes. And many people are unengaged health-
plan consumers. Brown writes wryly: "The public is not running to 
government demanding longer lists of plans and therewith more chances to 
ask more probing questions, sift more information, and wage a more valiant 
inner struggle against their suspicions of purchasers, plans, and providers." 207 
This should not seem strange when we think more attentively about how 
people actually live their lives. What people most fundamentally want is not 
so much "control" as doing the things that are important to them - working at 
rewarding jobs with congenial colleagues, spending time with the people they 
love and like, enjoying their leisure, and so on. People have better things to do 
than make risky decisions about alarming subjects which require burdensome 
202 Ruth Helman et al, 280 EBRI Issue Brief at 6 (cited in note 185). 
203 Id at 25. 
204 Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Difined 
Contribution Saving Plans, 91 Am Econ Rev 79, 79 (2001). 
205 Id at 95. "Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of 401(k) participants' asset allocation 
choices is the large fraction of balances invested in employer stock .... For firms that offer 
company stock in their plans ... about 33 percent of plan assets are held in this asset class." 
Choi et al, Difined Contribution Pensions at 27 (cited in note 201). Investing heavily in your 
employer's stock flouts the diversification principle, partly because you already rely on your 
employer for your economic welfare. (The consequences are sadly shown by the fate of the 
Enron employees whose pensions were invested in Enron stock). 
206 Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 Stanford 
L Rev 1, 12 (2003). 
207 Brown, 56 Med Care Res & Rev at 151 (cited in note 68). 
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work with scant visible reward. Furthermore, if people really tried to make 
independent decisions about everything in their lives, they'd do little else. 
Who wants to live in a world in which everybody must choose everything 
about everything? So, we are increasingly freed from paternalism, for we have 
proliferating choices about proliferating things, but we are increasingly 
prisoners of the need to learn enough to handle decisions that we make badly, 
that we would like to escape, and that divert us from things we would rather 
devote ourselves to. Getting and spending we truly lay waste our powers. 
This doesn't mean, of course, that people want or expect to avoid choices 
altogether. But people confide themselves to experts (like doctors, of course). 
They hope (and they expect) that they will be protected against disaster, that 
they will not be offered dangerous options. They expect doctors to lead them 
to medical prudence. They expect employers to offer them safe pensions. 
They expect credit card terms to be fair. They expect cars to be safe. They 
expect to be offered safe mortgages. 
So too with health plans, providers, and treatments. As Brown rightly 
says, people want "assurance that the plans they choose will not treat them 
badly and that some accountable body puts consumers' protection high on its 
agenda."208 When people's expectations are disappointed, they want action. 
Brown describes a common pattern. "'[C]hoice'- process, symbol, theoretical 
linchpin of market visions - is now ubiquitous" in health policy. But it 
is also richly ambiguous. Talk about "protecting and promoting 
consumer choice" often means two different things, namely, 
ensuring that consumers have the power to make appropriately 
abundant choices and ensuring that the products (health plans 
and providers) from among which consumers choose are safe and 
reliable. The first meaning expands the range of choices, depends 
on consumers to shop and buy prudently, and invigorates the 
market. The second eliminates harmful choices, invokes 
regulation to protect consumers, and expects government to 
police and discipline the market.209 
So "health policy debates tend to start out with hearty affirmations of the 
first version of choice, only to discover that many problems beset its 
realization. Reformers then look to the second set of connotations to discern 
the protections consumers need in order to reap the benefits of expanded 
choice .... "210 But this reduces the range of choice and drives up costs. 
So people want what they can't have. They want choice when they want it, 
but they want protection against over-reaching vendors and improvident 
decisions. They want cheap mortgages, but they want to be rescued when the 
terms that made the mortgages cheap backfire. They want "that consoling 
plenitude of option in which modern satisfaction really consists."211 But they 
expect that all their options will be good ones. This is not wicked; it is human. 
But it bodes ill for the consumerist vision of the vigilant, vigorous, and 
victorious consumer. 
2oa Id. 
209 Id at 145. 
210 Id at 146. 
211 Philip Rieff, The Triumph of The Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud 26 (Harper 
& Row, 1966). 
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C. THRIFT, THRIFT, HORATIO 
We have argued that consumerism specifically and the law of mandated 
disclosure generally rest on the homo arbiter misconception of human nature. 
Homo arbiter makes decisions willingly and well. But people are less ardent 
and attentive consumers than that. How well then, do people reason their 
way through the decisions consumerism presents? 
In their normal lives, in their normal spheres, normal people normally 
make normal decisions adeptly. But weighing health plans, providers, and 
treatments is not a normal activity (except to some extent for the chronically 
ill). A lovely literature now catalogs the ways people working outside their 
normal spheres disserve their goals. That people choose crudely and clumsily 
does not, of course, mean that they should not be allowed to choose. But it 
has consequences for consumerism's prospects and for pressuring people into 
making consumerist decisions. 
What, then, would it take for people to pick plans, providers, and 
treatments as shrewdly as consumerism demands? The standard formula for 
medical decisions is that people should "critically assess their own values and 
preferences; determine whether they are desirable; affirm, upon reflection, 
these values as ones that should justify their actions; and then be free to 
initiate action to realize the values."212 This placidly hides a maelstrom of 
problems. 
A scholar of medical decisions wrote years ago that "the stresses of making 
major decisions and the various ways people deal with those stresses . . . 
frequently result in defective forms of problem solving that fail to meet the 
standards of rational decision making. "213 Since then, psychologists have 
ingeniously shown how strangely we all perceive and parse the world. A new 
subfield - behavioral economics -incorporates into traditional economics this 
revised view. People are not the utility maximizers of traditional economics. 
Because they have limited resources for making decisions, people do not even 
try to make optimal ones. They "satisfice." They take shortcuts in getting and 
using information; they settle for the adequate instead of the best. Satisficing 
and shortcuts usually, well, satisfice. However, "[s]ome of these shortcuts 
systematically color and bias the decisions that individuals reach .... "214 And 
the more exotic, arcane, and momentous a decision, the worse satisficing is. 
Consumerist decisions often are exotic, arcane, and momentous. Satisficing 
may not suffice. 215 
212 Arthur L. Caplan, Informed Consent and Provider/Patient Relationships in 
Rehabilitation Medicine, in If I Were a Rich Man Could I Buy a Pancreas? and Other Essays 
on the Ethics of Health Care 245 (Indiana U Press, 1992). 
213 Irving L. Janis, The Patient as Decision Maker, in W. Doyle Gentry, ed, Handbook of 
Behavioral Medicine 326, 333 (Guilford, 1984). 
214 Id at 1531. 
215 The vast literature on the sadly abundant defects in human reasoning is still well 
described in two classics: Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and 
Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Prentice-Hall, 1980); Daniel Kahneman et al, Judgment 
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge U Press, 1982). A more recent 
summary of evidence that was written for lawyers is Paul Slovic, Rational Actors and Rational 
Fools: The Influence of Affect on Judgment and Decision-Making, 6 Roger Williams U L Rev 
163 (2000). Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness (Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), surveys the 
issues with welcome wit. Barak Richman, Behavioral Economics and Health Policy: 
Understanding Medicaid's Failure, 90 Cornell L Rev 705 (2005), applies the literature to 
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A sampling suggests the gravity of these problems. The standard formula 
for making medical decisions assumes consumers have preferences. Not just 
preferences - "a set of preferences which are clearly-defined, well-understood, 
and rank-ordered so that people can make logical tradeoffs among them."216 
But, as Slovic warns, preferences are not "simply read off some master list." 
We have no set of pre-formed preferences for all occasions. More than we 
know or like, we create preferences as we go along, preferences shaped by the 
very process of decision. As Slovic explains, "Preferences appear to be 
remarkably labile" and "are often constructed - not merely revealed - in the 
elicitation process."217 
So as Hibbard puts it, "individuals may not have existing preferences or 
beliefs about self-interest, but, rather, construct them in the process of 
deciding." This is particularly true of "choices among options that are 
important, complex, and unfamiliar, like those consumers face in the current 
health care environment."218 Thus while consumers do have preferences about 
familiar purchases, "it appears that ... medical care consumers have no well-
formed preferences."219 No wonder: Few of us have worked out any beliefs so 
systematically, much less beliefs about things both distant and dreadful. 
Evidence of people's inchoate and unsettled preferences is that people's 
choices about even momentous medical topics are unstable. For example, in a 
group of chronically ill elderly patients, "preferences for potentially life-
sustaining treatment, assessed in terms of participants' willingness to endure 
high-burden treatment for a given chance to avoid death or risk disability to 
avoid death, were frequently inconsistent. Many participants became more 
and then less willing (or vice versa) over time to undergo future high-burden 
therapy or to risk severe disability."220 A famous study investigated a natural-
childbirth class. It had well worked-out beliefs about anesthesia and pain, but 
at "the beginning of active labor ... there was a shift in the preference toward 
avoiding labor pains." But "the mothers' preferences shifted again at 
postpartum toward avoiding the use of anesthesia during the delivery of her 
next child."221 
Instability affects choices of health plans too. Buying insurance requires 
imagining how you will feel about possible futures. Not only do "focus group 
studies with health care consumers suggest that preferences are not stable," 
health care policy. Block-Lieb and Janger, 84 Texas L Rev 1481 (cited in note 75), applies this 
literature to a problem with important parallels to the consumerism question. Howard 
Margolis, Dealing With Risk: Why the Public and the Experts Disagree on Environmental 
Issues 33 (cited in note 189), applies the literature to a broader set of issues. 
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Angela Fagerlin and Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 34 Hastings 
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but "preference shifts have been observed even within the time frame of a 
focus group .... "222 
Satisficing is risky for other reasons. People succumb to a cavalcade of 
well-studied failures in perception, anticipation, and reasoning. Several 
examples: First, the "availability heuristic" leads people to over-estimate the 
likelihood of memorable and under-estimate the likelihood of mundane 
occurrences. Second, people's reasoning is skewed by the "anchoring 
heuristic," by having a starting point, however arbitrary. For example, 
estimates of an item's cost are changed by giving people an arbitrary number -
like the last two digits of their Social Security number. Third, people are 
notoriously influenced by the way choices are "framed." For instance, 
treatment looks better if described in terms of its chance of success rather 
than its chance of failure (even though both statistics describe the same 
likelihood). Fourth, once people have made up their minds, they ingeniously 
interpret new evidence - however damning - as confirming their choice. 
Fifth, despite all these infirmities, people are invincibly confident that they 
make good decisions. "Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of 
men's minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as 
one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor 
shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to 
themselves?"223 
Decisions are distorted more oddly. Decisions turn on how people expect 
to respond in possible futures, but people chronically mispredict those 
responses. This is the problem of hedonic forecasting, about which a 
bemusing literature is blooming. People mispredict even mundane feelings, 
mispredict what they will want and how they will like what they get. They 
mispredict which snacks they will prefer over the next three weeks, how happy 
election results will make them, how much happier living in California instead 
of Michigan will make them, how much criticism will wound them, and how 
painful visiting dentists and other tormenters will be. 224 Predicting reactions 
to insurance coverage, providers, illness, and treatment is surely harder.225 
We all suffer these defects in reasoning, although experience making a 
decision moderates them. This suggests another concern. It takes 
intelligence, sometimes much intelligence, to make sense of what you are 
learning, organize it in your mind, anticipate your future, and dissect your 
choices. "[I]ntelligence is manifested in generic thinking skills such as 
efficient learning, reasoning, problem solving, and abstract thinking. High 
intelligence is a useful tool in any life domain, but especially when tasks are 
novel, untutored, or complex and situations are ambiguous, changing, or 
unpredictable."226 Medical decisions fit that description, and "being a patient 
requires the same cognitive skills that . . . most jobs require for good 
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Med Care Res & Rev 169, 170 (2007). 
223 Francis Bacon, Of Truth, in The Essays 61 (Penguin, 1985). 
22~ Garrison and Schneider, The Law of Bioethics at 306-307 (cited in note 27), reviews 
this research. 
225 For fascinating applications of these ideas to medical situations, see Peter Ubel, 
You're Stronger Than You Think (McGraw-Hill, 2006). 
226 Linda S. Gottfredson & Ian J. Deary, Intelligence Predicts Health and Longevity, But 
Why?, 13 Current Directions Psych Sci 1, 2 (2004). 
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performance: efficient learning, reasoning, and problem solving."227 Many 
people lack the intellectual skills needed to choose unfamiliar things well, 
since even people rich in intellectual advantage flinch and fail in making 
health care choices. 
People, in sum, do not select plans, providers, and treatments in the 
methodical, meticulous way consumerism intends. They do not use the full 
range of relevant information, or evaluate information meticulously, or 
scrutinize their preferences. One way we know this is that people often 
choose so rapidly that they cannot be surveying, assessing, and weighing 
options. In one typical study, almost two-thirds of kidney donors made "an 
immediate choice." They "volunteer[ed] immediately upon hearing of the 
need without any time delay or any period of deliberation, and they 
themselves regard their choice as no decision at all." Only "25% of the donors 
... seem to have approximated a classical decision-making pattern," since 
they "had done some deliberating and weighing of costs and gains."228 
How can people treat serious things so brusquely? They almost must: 
"Making trade-off's to integrate conflicting dimensions into an overall choice 
is such a complex cognitive task that people tend to use heuristic shortcuts 
that may not produce optimal decisions. These simplified strategies include 
selecting only one dimension and ignoring others or focusing on concrete, 
easy to understand concepts such as cost rather than more complicated and 
less precise factors such as quality indicators .... "229 The more overwhelming 
a decision seems, the likelier radical shortcuts are taken. 230 
For example, patients often base even classically controversial decisions 
on a single factor. Thus, one illuminating study of breast cancer patients 
concluded that the leading "influence on decision-making behavior" was 
"perceived salience." In other words, one aspect of the treatment determined 
the whole decision. These patients "did not report conflict about what course 
to take or the need for further information or deliberation."231 Schneider 
observed "similarly truncated courses of decision" in prospective dialysis 
patients. They listened "until they heard some arresting fact and then based 
their decision on it. For instance, as soon as some patients hear that 
hemodialysis requires inserting two large needles into an arm thrice weekly, 
they opt for whatever the alternative is. When some other patients hear 
peritoneal dialysis means having a tube protruding from their abdomen, they 
choose 'the other kind of dialysis."'232 
Snap decisions are not confined to treatment choices; health plans seem 
often to be similarly chosen. Consider this powerful a fortiori example. 
Hibbard et al. say that even employers' health care specialists make decisions 
poorly. "Half of the purchasers in our survey thought that it was difficult or 
227 Linda S. Gottfredson, Intelligence: Is It the Epidemiologists' Elusive "Fundamental 
Cause" of Social Class Inequalities in Health, 86 J Personality & Social Psych 174, 175 (2004). 
228 Roberta G. Simmons, et al, Gift of Life: The Social and Psychological Impact of 
Organ Transplantation 241 (Transaction Books, 1987) (emphasis in original). 
229 Lubalin and Harris-Kojetin, 56 Med Care Res & Rev at 88 (cited in 77). 
230 Hanoch and Rice, 84 Milbank Qat 41 (cited in note 163). 
231 Penny F. Pierce, Deciding on Breast Cancer Treatment: A Description of Decision 
Behavior, 42 Nursing Res 20, 23 (1993). 
232 Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy 94-95 (cited in note 20). For an extended 
development of these points, see id at 92-99. 
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very difficult to bring all of the variables together into a decision. "233 Only 
about a fifth used "some kind of system for making trade-offs and identifying 
high-performing, cost-effective plans," and the "system" could be as primitive 
as a four-cell matrix. 234 "Twelve percent reported that they made their choices 
on the basis of a single dimension such as cost or geographic access."235 
Purchasers depended on inferior information about hospital quality. They 
used the best information (outcomes data) only about a quarter of the time it 
was available, for example.236 "Purchasers do not always understand the intent 
of the quality indicators and do not always interpret them correctly."237 If this 
is how professionals fare, what hope for us amateurs? 
Again, this is characteristic of how people operate in other contexts. For 
example, loan terms differ scarily, but "the basic rule of thumb for borrowing 
seems to be: 'Can I afford the monthly payment?'" This simplifies choice, but 
it obviates "any calculation or awareness of the cost of credit. It also obscures 
any comparison between the cost of credit and the cost of paying ... out of 
savings, and any comparison of competing credit offers. Most importantly, it 
renders disclosure of APR and related credit terms interesting but 
irrelevant. "238 
Ultimately, what matters is whether patients can choose plans, providers, 
and treatments with the combination of quality and cost that best suits them 
and thus helps restrain medical costs. Can they? Consumerism sometimes 
produces some of its intended effects in some ways in some measure. Patients 
with less insurance and patients spending their own money behave differently 
from patients spending insurance money. Fronstin and Collins report that 60 
to 74 percent of people enrolled in consumerist plans strongly or somewhat 
agreed that the terms of their health plans made them consider costs when 
deciding to see a doctor when sick or fill a prescription. By comparison, 
"fewer than half ( 47 percent) of those in more comprehensive plans felt this 
way .... " Similarly, sixty percent of those enrolled in consumerist plans said 
that they had checked whether their health plan would cover their costs prior 
to receiving care, while 50 percent "of those in comprehensive plans had 
checked whether their plans would cover care" and 21 percent had checked 
the price of a service. 239 While this suggests that consumerism can change 
people's behavior, it is far from showing that enough people "consider costs" 
regularly enough and correctly enough to reduce costs significantly without 
impairing patients' health. 
But do patients economize undesirably? There is some encouraging news 
on this front. Almost two decades ago, the RAND experiment found that 
"reduced service use under the cost-sharing plans had little or no net adverse 
effect on health for the average person .... "240 However, that experiment's 
233 Judith H. Hibbard et a!, Choosing a Health Plan: Do Large Employers Use the Data?, 
16 Health Affairs 172, 177 (1997). 
234 Id at 177. 
2as Id. 
236 Id at 175. 
237 Id at 179. 
238 Block-Lieb and Janger, 84 Texas L Rev at 1539 (cited in note 75). 
239 Fronstin and Collins, 315 EBRI Issue Brief at 33, 40 (cited in note 23). 
240 Joseph P. Newhouse, Free For All?: Lessons from the Rand Health Insurance 
Experiment 339 (Harvard U Press, 1993). 
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deductibles were lower than the upper range of deductibles today (inflation-
adjusted, around $2500-3000). And crucially, "[h]ealth among the sick poor 
- approximately the most disadvantaged 5 percent of the population - was 
adversely affected .... "241 
There is also disquieting evidence about how well patients negotiate 
between underuse and wasteful use of medical care. For example, a recent 
attempt "to assess whether CDHP enrollees are more likely to make cost-
effective, evidence-based care choices than those who are enrolled in a PPO" 
similarly found "that enrollment in CDHPs resulted in a reduction of both 
high-priority and low-priority care (cost-effective and less cost-effective 
care)."242 Distinguishing between the two is difficult. Consider one kind of 
under-use - postponing consultation with a doctor. People often do so 
unwisely and expensively. "Over 30 percent of cancer patients ... postpone 
seeking a diagnosis for three or more months after they first notice growths or 
other symptoms that they know could be danger signs."243 Many people 
having heart attacks delay calling a doctor for four or five hours because "the 
decision making process gets jammed by the patient's inability to admit that 
he is mortally sick. "244 
Some of the problem is medical ignorance, but only some. For example, 
people who know cancer's danger signs are likelier to postpone seeing a 
physician than people who do not.245 Cost deters some patients from seeking 
care, but again this is not the whole story. Over one-third of the English 
families with free health care had a member who was "suffering from pain or 
discomfort but was not receiving medical treatment."246 Much of the story is 
fear, which can lead to seeking care both too aggressively and too timidly. As 
one man ruefully wrote, "In full health, I imagine minor ailments to be 
dangerous symptoms, or else, from fear, ignore them away. I do not submit 
routinely to preventive medicine. What may it not show up?"247 
Most significantly, there is plentiful evidence that cost pressure on 
patients can lead them to damaging economies. For example, "incentive-
based formularies are associated with lower costs and smaller increases in 
drug utilization and expenditures compared with control groups." However, 
those formularies are also "associated with undesirable effects." Patients 
confronted "with higher copayments are more likely to switch medications or 
to discontinue medications entirely. Moreover, studies have found that cost 
sharing may be followed by reductions in the use of 'essential' drugs, higher 
rates of serious adverse events, and increased use of emergency department 
visits and hospital days."248 
24t Id. 
242 Judith H. Hibbard et al, Does Enrollment in a CDHP Stimulate Cost-Effective 
Utilization?, 65 Medical Care Research and Review 437, 445 (2008). 
243 Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of 
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244 T.P. Hackett and N.H. Cassem, Psychological Management of the Myocardial 
Infarction Patient, 1 J Human Stress 25, 27 (1975). 
245 This is long established. See, e.g., B. Kutner et al, Delay in the Diagnosis and 
Treatment of Cancer: A Critical Analysis of the Literature, 7 J Chronic Diseases 95 (1958). 
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One study of Medicare+Choice beneficiaries is typical and telling enough 
to be described in block quotes: 
[L]imits on drug benefits had consistently negative 
consequences. Beneficiaries whose benefits were capped used 
fewer prescription drugs overall and fewer drugs for the 
treatment of chronic diseases than those whose benefits were not 
capped. The differences in consumption between beneficiaries 
with and those without caps on their benefits were substantially 
larger during the months after the subjects exceeded the cap than 
during earlier months .... Overall, subjects whose benefits were 
capped had higher rates of non-elective hospitalizations, visits to 
the emergency department, and death. In addition, subjects 
whose benefits were capped had lower pharmacy costs but higher 
hospital and emergency department costs, with no significant 
difference in total medical costs between the two groups.249 
These findings were 
consistent with those of previous survey-based studies. Nearly a 
third of Medicare beneficiaries reported taking fewer drugs than 
were prescribed in order to save money, and less generous drug 
benefits were associated with lower rates of drug adherence. In 
non-Medicare, low-income populations, drug limits increased 
nursing home admissions. High patient cost-sharing levels in 
Canada were associated with a lower rate of use of essential drugs 
and higher rates of visits to the emergency department and 
hospitalizations. The lack of any drug coverage has been 
associated with poor outcomes.250 
Rice and Matsuoka summarize the literature similarly: "Nearly all of the 
22 relevant studies examined that have been published since 1990 - 16 
focusing on cost-sharing for prescription drugs and 6 on cost-sharing for 
medical services - conclude that increased cost-sharing reduces either or both 
the [appropriate] utilization and health status of seniors."251 
Are these patients simply too poor to buy all the care they need? Or are 
they economizing improvidently? Surely both. But given such hard decisions, 
it would be surprising if the latter answer did not explain a good deal. 
We have asked how well even knowledgeable consumers make decisions. 
Contemporary scholarship finds a festival of ways people stumble in making 
decisions. This is true, but it is easily misunderstood. So, three reminders. 
First, we are not saying that nobody ever makes good decisions. We are saying 
that people have trouble with unfamiliar and complex choices, like selecting 
health plans, providers, and treatments. 
Second, we are not implying that people's decisional reluctance justifies 
usurping their decisional authority. On the contrary, we are evaluating a 
249 John Hsu et al, Unintended Consequences of Caps on Medicare Drug Benefits, 354 
NEJM 2349, 2356 (2006). 
250 Id at 2356-2357. 
251 Thomas Rice & K.Y. Matsuoka, The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Appropriate 
Utilization and Health Status: A Review of the Literature on Seniors, 61 Med Care Res & Rev 
415, 415 (2004). 
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program - consumerism - intended to compel people to make decisions willy-
nilly. 
Third, consumerism, like the law of mandated disclosure generally, is 
misled by its homo arbiter model of human nature. That model assumes that 
people want to make all the decisions that affect their lives and that they will 
be motivated and able to make those decisions well. Both assumptions 
contain important truth and important misconceptions. Many people will 
shrug off the burden consumerism would impose on them. We all have 
trouble making many of those decisions well and with a good chance of 
reaching results that serve our own goals. And that sets consumerism on an 
uphill road. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Of course, this is a somewhat vague conclusion. But in a question of 
significance, of worth, like this, conclusions can never be precise. The 
answer of appreciation, of sentiment, is always a more or a less, a 
balance struck by sympathy, insight, and good will. But it is an 
answer, all the same, a real conclusion. And in the course of getting it, 
it seems to me that our eyes have been opened to many important 
things. 
William James 
What Makes a Life Significant 
A. CONSUMERS ON THE CLATTERING TRAIN 
Consumerism inspires zeal in a few proponents252 and hope in a few 
quarters. To return to our clattering-train metaphor, consumerists want us 
consumers in charge of the providers and insurers who seem to run the train. 
We have not tried to evaluate consumerism globally, to survey every kind of 
issue it raises. Rather, we have singled out one crucial question: What would 
the consumer's world and the patient's life be like in a consumerist system? 
Would people succeed at the tasks they would have to perform for 
consumerism to subdue health care costs and to help patients get the care 
they want? 
We have answered those questions by identifYing consumerism's 
prerequisites and asking if they can be met. The prerequisites are 
disconcertingly many. First, consumers must be offered the coverage, 
caretakers, and care they need. Second, reliable information about those 
choices must be available. Third, information must be put before consumers, 
especially by doctors. Fourth, consumers must receive the information. Fifth, 
the information must be adequately complete and comprehensible. Sixth, 
252 AJ;; one reviewer says of one zealot and her book, "She and the majority of her 92 
contributors . . . are convinced that a new age is dawning. AJ;; a consequence, this book 
projects an almost messianic fervor; it brims with the confidence and enthusiasm of converts 
to a great cause." Arnold S. Reiman, Review of Regina E. Herzlinger, ed, Consumer-Driven 
Health Care: Implications for Providers, Payers, and Policy-Makers (2004), 350 NEJM 2217, 
2217 (2004). 
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consumers must understand what they are told. Seventh, consumers must be 
willing to analyze the information. Eighth, consumers must actually analyze 
the information and do so well enough to make good choices. 
Each prerequisite must be met; a failure at any stage can preclude 
accurate decisions. Can all these prerequisites be met? Not reliably; they are 
too numerous and too often too demanding. 
Two kinds of evidence tended to confirm this conclusion. First, we 
frequently have drawn parallels between consumerism and the legal device of 
mandated disclosure. As we have seen, mandated disclosure has often 
betrayed the hopes entertained for it. Second, consumerism rests on 
misleading assumptions about human nature. People often resist proffers of 
decisional authority, and they often stumble in making unfamiliar decisions. 
This too dims the prospects of meeting consumerism's prerequisites. 
When we recall our clattering train, the consumer's situation looks even 
worse. The train is impelled by forces strong and many. Consumerism leaves 
most of them unaltered. It directly addresses the moral-hazard problem, but 
most other dynamics of the health care system remain unaffected. Insofar as 
consumerism addresses those dynamics, it is by us all to manage them. This 
task overwhelmed managed care. Like consumerism, managed care counted 
on market forces. Will consumers fare better with those forces? 
Partly, this depends on the politics of consumerism. For example, 
consumerism needs the cooperation and even commitment of both employers 
and employees. But a "recent study of employers' attitudes toward such 
programs suggests some ambivalence on their part. They are uncertain about 
the effect of such programs on costs and quality, and most significantly, 
perhaps, whether such programs will in fact be popular with employees 
•••• "
253 The Community Tracking Study recently found "deep skepticism" 
among a full range of market participants that consumerism can "produce 
urgently needed improvements in the efficiency and quality of the nation's 
health care system. As much as these predominantly private-sector leaders 
dread the prospect of deeper interventions by government, few of them seem 
to be able to imagine other alternatives. "254 
Discouragement, distrust, and dislike are not conclusive, but they are 
critical. First, the history of managed care teaches that a detested health 
policy is a dead one. Managed care was less culpable than people thought and 
deserves more esteem than it enjoys. Yet like St. Sebastian it twists in agony 
as it is pierced from all sides with arrows. The revolt against managed care 
was remarkable: legislation attacking particular cost-saving measures 
(including so-called "drive-by deliveries"),255 legislation prohibiting "gag-rules" 
said to restrict what doctors could tell patients, 256 patients' "bills of rights," 
253 Callahan and Wasunna, Medicine and the Market at 77 (cited in note 12). 
254 Nichols et al, 23 Health Affairs at 8 (cited in note 19). 
255 For an acidulous argument that Congress had it wrong, see David A. Hyman, Drive-
Through Deliveries: Is "Consumer Protection" Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 NC L Rev 5 
(1999). 
256 
"After condemnation of such clauses by every member of Congress who spoke on the 
subject, the General Accounting Office determined that there were no true gag clauses in any 
of the 1,150 contracts they examined .... Opponents of managed care also have yet to produce 
a single true gag clause .... " David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care 
World: Should Consumers Call911?, 43 Viii L Rev 409, 409 n142 (1998). Nor have providers 
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legislation and litigation inhibiting managed care plans from excluding 
doctors from their networks, legislation to "amend ERISA and permit patients 
to sue their MCO and states to regulate managed care,"257 and so on. The 
number, scope, stringency, and success of these attacks on managed care 
suggest how powerfully doctors and patients can insist on the control over 
medicine they have recently enjoyed, despite a consensus that health care 
costs must be constrained. 
To be sure, the public has itself (partly) to blame for consumerism and 
may well have boxed itself into a consumerist corner. That public can't bear 
government regulation of expenditures. It can't agree on universal health 
care. It helped sabotage managed care. In other words, "as the 1990s' HMO 
debate showed, [the public] wants fine health care benefits with no 
bureaucratic cost-control measures to limit that care"258 but not to pay what 
such benefits cost. So "[g]overnment, booed off the field, handed the ball to 
market forces," Brown says dryly. Those forces did "what they are supposed to 
do - squeeze waste, change payment systems, redefine necessary and 
appropriate care, favor primary care, and the rest. Yet the general public and 
special groups increasingly demand closer regulation of the new system," a 
demand government is "ever more willing to meet."259 
This is all understandable; tout comprendre, beaucoup pardonner. Health 
care organization, regulation, and finance are so Byzantine and baroque that a 
sober and sophisticated political discussion of them is unimaginable.26° Faced 
with illness (their own or someone else's), people reflexively say damn the 
price (especially since the price has so long been so obscured by insurance). 
And the public has been incited to misunderstanding and indignation by 
institutions less easily pardoned - particularly the medical establishment. 
Organizations like the AMA have served their members' economic interests 
and demands for professional autonomy by resisting managed care and other 
promising attempts to control medical costs, not least physicians' fees. 261 And 
doctors have shown as a profession that they exalt their guild interests at the 
expense of their patients' welfare.262 This matters because, as we have shown, 
patients' spending usually is directed by doctors. If doctors do not whole-
heartedly help patients economize, consumerism cannot cool health care costs 
We have tested consumerism against its proponents' claims. Would 
consumerism look better if those claims were moderated? Surely. First, any 
plausible approach to American health care finance will use some consumerist 
presented any "proof that any of these proVIsiOns are being enforced in a way that 
systematically restricts communications between providers and patients." David A. Hyman, 
Managed Care at the Millennium: Scenes from a Maul, 24 J Health Politics, Policy & L 1061, 
1064 (1999). 
257 Jacobson, 47 SLU L J at 381 (cited in note 35). 
258 Callahan and Wasunna, Medicine and the Market at 50 (cited in note 12). 
259 Brown, 56 Med Care Res & Rev at 151-52 (cited in note 68). 
260 For a sobering example, see Theda Skocpol's analysis of the collapse of the Clinton 
reform- Boomerang: Health Care Reform and the Turn Against Government (Norton, 1997). 
261 For the history, see Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: 
The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry (Harper Collins, 1982). 
262 As the dying Cardinal Wolsey famously lamented, "[b]ut if I had served God as 
diligently as I have done the King, he would not have given me over in my grey hairs. Howbeit 
this is the just reward that I must receive for my worldly diligence and pains that I have had to 
do him service, only to satisfY his vain pleasures, not regarding my godly duties." 
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devices. Such devices already proliferate in the form of shared premiums, co-
payments, and deductibles. 
Second, patients care about and can evaluate some aspects of care. In 
particular, patients want respect and solicitude.263 Prudent providers might 
respond to consumerism by trying to accommodate them. "The healthcare 
industry - as ironic as it may seem - has not functioned as a true customer-
oriented service industry. It is now seeking to shift models and to better 
understand the phenomenon of patient satisfaction. "264 Some providers are 
using "survey research methods to obtain customer (patient) feedback with 
respect to service, process, and facilities. This is especially true within the 
fastest growing sector associated with the family-centered practice."265 
Third, at least consumerism brings some costs home to patients, however 
clumsily. Could this at least help consumers realize that costs won't be 
controlled until they get help persuading doctors to attack costs systematically 
and until they accept a system that does not give them everything they 
want?266 People do realize now that, in various ways, health costs are a severe 
problem.267 Can consumerism help them see that better cost-control might be 
possible with managed care run in the patients' interests? Can consumerism 
induce them to apply enough political pressure for such a reform ?268 We 
dearly hope so. 
B. RICHER RICH AND POORER POOR 
Consumerism embodies two of the central preoccupations of 
contemporary health law and policy - controlling costs and extending 
patients' authority over their care. We have shown that many unlikely things 
have to happen for consumerism to achieve its advocates' expectations. But 
there is another problem with consumerism. It fails to address the continuing 
scandal of American health policy - the fact that almost 50 million people are 
uninsured and at least as many are poorly insured269 and that much evidence 
shows "large health disparities between the disadvantaged in the United 
263 For a discussion of what patients want and what they get in today's bureaucratized 
medicine, see Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy at 181-231 (cited in note 20). 
2~>< Barry Eisenberg, Customer Service in Healthcare: A New Era, 42 Hospital & Health 
Services Admin 17, 20 (1997). 
265 Raj Arora et al, Influence of Key Variables on the Patients' Choice of a Physician, 13 
Quality Management Health Care 166, 166 (2004). 
266 This argument is made in detail in Mark A. Hall and Clark C. Havighurst, Reviving 
Managed Care With Health Savings Accounts, 24 Health Affairs 1490 (2005). 
267 Asked to describe the few "most important health care problems," people first 
mentioned the "cost of health care services, the lack of or inadequate health insurance 
coverage, and the cost of prescription drugs. In combination, costs were the top issue for 
approximately half of respondents." Robert J. Blendon et al, Americans' Health Priorities: 
Curing Cancer and Controlling Costs, 20 Health Affairs 222, 227-228 (2001). 
268 People praise health care reform. But their support can "be quickly tempered by 
messages implying that personal sacrifices might be required to deal with the broader 
problems." Support "plummeted if Americans heard that reform would limit their choice of 
doctors or hospitals, would require rationing, would reduce the quality of care most persons 
now receive, or would require more than a modest tax increase." Robert J. Blendon et al, What 
Happened to Americans' Support for the Clinton Health Plan?, 8 Health Affairs 7, 12 (1995). 
269 For some specifics, see Jessica H. May and Peter J. Cunningham, Tough Trade-Offs: 
Medical Bills, Family Finances and Access to Care, 85 Issue Brief Center Studying Health 
System Change 1, 1 (2004). 
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States and those who are more privileged .... "270 Worse, it moves in the 
opposite direction; it benefits most those who least need help and most 
disadvantages those most in need. 
Of course it does. The prosperous do better in markets than the 
impecunious. The poor, the illiterate, the elderly, the really sick, profit least 
from consumerism, while to profit substantially, it helps to be well off, well 
educated, and healthy. For example, the federal government's way of 
promoting consumerism specially benefits the wealthy, healthy, and childless: 
Health savings accounts are tax-advantaged, but that is useless to people with 
modest income. HSAs can accumulate from year to year, but the sick and 
families with children rapidly spend each year's allotment. And consumerism 
leaves to their fates the unemployed and the under-insured. Even people 
whose employers provide good insurance often struggle with high deductibles. 
Many of them are economically marginal and barely make it from paycheck to 
paycheck.271 But what are high deductibles to wealthier patients?272 
Consumerism's favors are for the well off in another way. Like mandated 
disclosure generally, it serves "the well educated and well situated far more 
than the illiterate and poor. Disclosures are more useful to the former than 
the latter because the former are better able to understand them and 
understand how to use them."273 Consumerism puts a premium on fending for 
yourself and negotiating for the best deal. The well-off have experience and 
resources to do so that the badly off lack. This can be true even where 
attempts have been made to simplifY information. For example, "Peters and 
colleagues found that using a traffic light symbol helped highly numerate 
consumers select better-quality hospitals. However, it reduced the ability of 
less numerate consumers to select the best-quality hospital. "274 
For example, "functional health literacy was worse among the elderly and 
individuals who reported poor overall health. Thus, groups with the highest 
prevalence of chronic disease and the greatest need for health care had the 
least ability to read and comprehend information needed to function as a 
patient."275 There were "striking differences between the Medicare and the 
younger sample in ability to use information accurately. Medicare 
beneficiaries made almost three times as many errors as the younger 
respondents did (25 percent versus 9 percent) . . . ."276 People in "poorer 
270 David Mechanic, Disadvantage Inequality and Social Policy: Major Initiatives 
Intended to Improve Population Health May Also Increase Health Disparities, 21 Health 
Affairs 48, 49 (2002). 
271 The 2006 median household income was $48,201. U.S. 
Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, online at 
http:/ /pubdb3.census.govfmacro/032007/hhinc/new04_00l.htm (visited Mar 16, 2009). 
272 For a forceful statement of ways the health care system already favors the well-to-do, 
see Havighurst and Richman, 69 L & Contemp Prob at 7 (cited in note 1). 
273 Carl E. Schneider, 41 Wake Forest L Rev at 443 (cited in note 30). 
274 Jessica Greene eta!, 14 The American Journal of Managed Care at 370 (cited in note 
26). 
275 Ad Hoc Committee on Health Literacy for the Council on Scientific Affairs, 
American Medical Association, Health Literacy: Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs, 281 
JAMA 552, 553 (1999). 
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health" and people "with less education" also "tended to make more errors."277 
The people who understood Medicare information least were also the people 
most likely to want to delegate decisions and to see "more information and 
options as unwelcome burdens. "278 In another study, the people who knew the 
least about Medicare choices "were older, had lower incomes, lower education, 
more nights in the hospital, and fewer doctor's office visits."279 Similarly, '1ess 
than half of the uninsured (48%) - or about 18 million people - use or are 
aware of a safety net provider in their community," suggesting "that many 
uninsured people do not know of an affordable source of care to turn to when 
they need medical attention."280 Yet "the least educated users of health care 
often have the greatest health needs and are vulnerable both to risk-selection 
in insurance and to substandard provision of care."281 
As we have seen, the problem is not just in understanding; it is in results. 
For example, in the Rand experiment the poorest people were the worst 
affected by consumerism. And as a more recent study reports, consumerism's 
"impact on utilization appears to be strongest for those with less education 
and income (hourly workers). That is, the observed effect is more prominent 
for those who have fewer resources. This suggests that the CDHP approach to 
cost sharing may further disadvantage those who are already less 
advantaged."282 Likewise, "[c]ost-sharing is perhaps the most studied aspect 
of the Medicaid program: a plethora of research concludes that even modest 
co-payments ... cause Medicaid patients to forego necessary, not just excess, 
medical care."283 This is consistent with long experience. For instance, 
"prevention efforts often attract those who least need them and fail to reach 
those most disadvantaged."284 
Thus we come to a final observation. We are grateful to live in a market 
economy. We cherish the market's ability to provide- so often- good things 
at good prices. If consumerism could deliver what its apostles promise, we 
would cheer. Any successful health care system will use market devices.285 
But when a resource so basic to human well-being - to human life - is so 
scarce for so many people, we need to think more broadly about our social 
responsibilities. The attempt to give individuals more control over their 
health care - whether through the market or through various mandated 
disclosures - has its moral merits. But it has come to dominate the ethics and 
law of health care to the detriment of a decent sense of our responsibilities to 
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"All health care systems are a mixture of public and private elements: the rise of the 
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our fellow citizens. "By its emphasis on choice, its eschewing of visions of the 
common good (much less social solidarity), and its focus on individual 
preferences as the (almost) final arbiter of political acceptability,"286 
consumerism shares the moral failing of much contemporary health policy. It 
speaks powerfully to the claims we make for ourselves but barely whispers 
about the claims others make on us. 
286 Id at 261. 
